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Synopsis
DUling the 1991 Persian Gulf war.! the retreating Iraqis caused the deliberate discharge of
six million barrels of oil into the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf.2 The immediate impact on the
ecosystem was dramatic, and, because of the intense media coverage of the conflict, highly visible
to the American public.3 The spill popularized the term 'ecoterrorism' and raised serious questions
about the applicability of international law to the situation."
There are numerous conventions that seek to establish standards of due diligence for the
prevention of accidental pollution and to impose civil liability on those who damage the
IThroughout this paper, wherever "the Gulf' appears, it refers to the Persian Gulf, also known as the Arabian
Gulf.
2A barrel of oil contains 42 gallons. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam
Company, 1975),91. Six million barrels of oil would be equal to 270 million gallons. Initial estimates by the
Saudi officials put the spill at over 10 million barrels, possibly for propaganda purposes, a number which was scaled
back as further information became available. Christopher Joyce and Dan Charles, "The Battle to Stop the Gulf
from Choking," New Scientist, 23 March 1991,20. This figure was eventually reduced by NOAA and other
authorities to roughly four to six million. Congressional Research Service, The Environmental Aftermath of the
Gulf War (Washington: Committee on Environment and Public Works Gulf Pollution Task Force, 1992),35
[hereinafter C.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf Warl. The normal method of estimating the amount
of oil spilled is to determine how much oil was in the tanker at the time of the accident, and then finding out how
much was lightered off or remained in the vessel's tanks after the spill was secured--this clearly was impossible to do
when the oil was being dumped from five different tankers and also being pumped directly from the island oil
terminal into the sea. The six million barrels of oil is thus of necessity a guesswork figure.
3The common standard of comparison in the American press was, of course, the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989,
in which some 11 million gallons (roughly 26,000 barrels) of heavy crude were dumped into Prince William Sound.
The world's largest spill, the 1979 blowout of the Ixtoc well in the Gulf of Mexico, released approximately 140
million gallons of oil, but had relatively little impact on coastal communities and marine life because winds and
currents kept it at sea. Robert D. McFadden, "Oil Threatens Fishing and Water Supply," The New York Times, 26
January 1991, AI. Another source put the Ixtoc spill at between 3.3 and 10.2 million barrels, highlighting the
difficulty in accurately estimating the size of a spill that comes from an underground source and, in the case of the
Ixtoc spill, ignited, resulting in a partial burn-off. C.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra
note 2, at 36.
4Ecoterrorism is also written as eco-terrorism, depending on the stylebook followed by the publication.
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environment, but these conventions govem the relations of peaceful nations and their applicability
in wartime situations is problematic. Entirely different legal and political considerations influenced
the development of the laws of war. "Incidental" or "collateral" environmental damage has long
been accepted as an unfortunate side-effect of hostilities.> Only recently have efforts been made to
address this issue, and to set forth some protective measures specifically designed to prevent
widespread environmental devastation during armed conflict. The Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniquese and Protocol I to
the 1949 Geneva Convention? were heralded as important steps forward in arms control
negotiations, and it was hoped that the nations party to these treaties would now be held
accountable to a higher standard of environmental concern during hostilities. What went wrong?
This paper will attempt to answer that question. Section I will describe the geography,
climate, and ecosystem of the Persian Gulf, and trace the events that led to the spill in order to
provide the background necessary to understand the magnitude of the pollution incident and the
degree of international concern it engendered. As with the Chernobyl disaster, information about
the oil spill was revealed only gradually.f The Coalition allies were forced to rely largely on
5"Military activities were not perceived as posing any special threat to environmental quality, although, in
fact, various tactics of scorched earth and crop destruction throughout the history of warfare did serious local
environmental harm, and there were occasional expressions of concern all along about injuries done to animals or
prized environmental surroundings." Richard A. FaIk:, "Environmental Disruption by Military Means and
International Law," in Environmental Warfare: A Technical. Legal and Policy Appraisal, ed. Arthur H. Westing
(London: Taylor and Francis, Ltd., 1984),36.
6United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 31/72, "Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use of
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques," 18 May 1977,31 U.S.T. 333,1108 U.N.T .S. 151. Reprinted in
International Legal Materials 16 (1977): 88-94 [hereinafter ENMOD Convention].
7United Nations, "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts," adopted on 8 June 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on
Reaffirmatiou and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, and ratified by the
United States on 12 December 1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Reprinted in International Legal Materials 16 (1977): 1391-
1433 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
8The Iraqis did not publicize their actions. Indeed, when the spill was discovered, Iraq initially claimed that it
was coming from oil tankers damaged by heavy U.S. bombing. See Kim Murphy and Charles P. Wallace, "Allies
Rally to Curb Oil Spill," The New York Times, 27 January 1991, A26. While the oil from the tankers contributed
to the spill, it clearly was not the sole source ; there was simply too much oil on the water.
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guesswork in trying to determine the source and size of the spill, where it would come ashore, and
the damage it would cause.? The clean-up effort is described in Section II, followed by a summary
of the actual damage caused when the spill came ashore. This section draws heavily on work done
by a team of international scientists embarked aboard the Mt. Mitchell, a NOAA research vessel
that visited the Gulf a year after the spill for the purpose of providing a mobile lab for the
researchers.
Section III of the paper will look at four relevant multilateral treaties governing
international conflict in an effort to trace the emergence of a growing concern for environmental
protection during combat. There is extensive literature on the laws of the war, and some of these
articles will be drawn on to explain the customary law that governs hostilities, and relate it to the
environmental concerns evident in treaty law. to Aside from the laws of war, there is also a
substantial body of conventional law dealing specifically with prevention of maritime pollution,
and particularly oil pollution. Section IV reviews the current pollution prevention treaties in an
effort to determine what responsibilities Iraq may have had under their auspices. and what liability
they may have incurred by dumping so much oil into the Gulf. 11 Since customary law is often the
precursor of formal treaty agreements, the development of customary or "soft law" concepts
placing an increasing priority on the preservation of the environment is also examined in Section
9"Infonnation about the slick has been smothered by the secrecy of the war that caused it Aerial and satellite
images of the area have been rare and most have been kept from public view. A task force of experts from the US,
Britain and Canada that has loured the Gulf has been discouraged from talking about the slick." Joyce and Charles,
"The Battle lOSLOP the Gulf from Choking," supra note 1, al20.
IOConventionallaw is law made by a treaty wherein a number of Slates act together to create a new rule that is
later adhered to by other states, either "through formal actio in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, or by
tacit acquiescence in and observance of the new rule." Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 6lh ed. (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 13 [hereinafter Law AmoDg Nations]. Customary law, on the other hand ,
comes into being over time . "In all instances a legal custom has come into being when it can be demonstrated that
states act or fail to act in a certain way because a sense of legally binding obligation has developed." Ibid., 17.
IIThis international environmental law imparts civil, rather than criminal, liability. That is to say, it seeks
only to assess and impose fines or other forms of monetary judgments designed to compensate the victims of
accidental pollution incidents.
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IV.12 The conclusion of these two sections is that though there are few conventions that directly
address the issue of deliberate wartime environmental damage, and none which are widely agreed
to apply to this situation, there are sufficient grounds in both conventional and customary law to
provide a basis for liability.
Section V treats the interesting question of whether the release of the oil into the Gulf was a
legitimate act of war in which Iraq used crude oil as a munition de guerre in accordance with its
precedent from the Iran/Iraq war. The actions of belligerent occupants are governed under the laws
of war, and, in particular, the rules of usufruct. The text of the applicable treaties will be examined
in order to determine whether Iraq acted in accordance with those rules, and whether the customary
law principle of military necessity, which was considered a mitigating circumstance during war
crime trials after World War II, comes into play in the situation.
But for law to be meaningful it must be enforceable. Section VI examines various options
that were debated for bringing Saddam Hussein to trial for the crime of ecoterrorism. A number
of Congressmen and legal experts were attracted to the idea of convening an international military
tribunal modeled after the Nuremberg tribunal. Two other popular options included creating an
international criminal court, or supporting some kind of legal action by the other Arab states in the
Gulf. The debate serves to illustrate the political, legal, and practical difficulties faced by any
nation desirous of enforcing international law. There are, however, some who say that the debate
is purely of academic interest, and that the Security Council Resolution 678,13 which mandated
12The relationship between customary and treaty law has been extensively studied by legal scholars and
publicists. One writer explains it in this way: "Creation and change of customary law are aspects of the same
general phenomenon; the establishment of articulated precedential situations which are new when custom is being
created and which represents departures from previous lines of conduct when custom is being changed. In both cases,
an innovating state runs a legal risk ... To safeguard themselves from such risks, states that are about to introduce
new patterns of international behavior have great incentive to secure in advance the agreement of foreign
governments who will be affected by the contemplated actions . For this and other reasons, states have historically
resorted to treaties ... " Anthony A. 0' Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1971), 103.
13Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. Doc S/RES/687 (8 April 1991), reprinted in International Le~al
Materials 30 (1991), 847-850.
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that the Iraqis make reparations for war damages, provided sufficient grounds for civil lawsuits.
The final section describes the actual consequences that befell Iraq. As the situation stands
in early 1994, there is no money in the Compensation Fund created by Resolution 687. No action
has been taken to name any defendants or to initiate any climinal proceedings in the worst
deliberate oil pollution incident in history. In conclusion, it is clear that the existing international
legal framework designed to prevent ecological destruction during hostilities failed to protect the
environment during the Gulf war, not because the laws on the books did not address the crime, but
because the victorious Coalition States lacked the political will to enforce them.
5
I. The Disaster
A. The Geographic Setting
The Persian Gulf is a relatively shallow body of water with an average depth of only 110
feet. It is 600 miles from north to south and 180 miles from east to west The only outlet for this
open ocean is severely
restricted, which means that it
Because of the Gulf s
confmed ecosystem is at the
may take as long time as five
the Straits of Honnuz, a
channel 37 miles wide. 14
geographic configuration, the
exchange of water with the
south end of the Gulf through
N'
N'
10'
10'
Figure 1 Gulfregion andoil impact area
years to flush pollutants from
the ecosystem. By
comparison, the water in the Prince William Sound, the side of the Exxon Valdez spill, is cleansed
every 28 days.15
The Gulf is a sedimentary basin, and, though there are some outeroppings of limestone and
14Frank Barnaby , "The Environmental Impact of the Gulf War," The Ecolo~ist 21 (July/August 1991): 170.
15Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries , Qversi~ht Hearine on the Ecoterrorism
InDicted as a Result of the persian Gulf War before the Commjttee on Merchant Marine and Fjsheries, 102nd Cong .,
tst sess., 17 October 1991, 5 [hereinafter Congress, Oyersi~ht Hearine on Ecoterrorisml . By comparison, Prince
William Sound, site of the Exxon Valdez spill, is cleansed every 28 days by the tides and currents of the northern
Pacific.
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a few actively growing coral reefs, most of the seabed is covered with biogenic sediments. 16 The
tidal patterns are irregular. Off the coast of Kuwait and Bahrain, the summer high tides cover
shallow areas in daytime and expose them at night, which offers some protection to the intertidal
communities. During the colder winter months, the water covers the intertidal area at night Off
the coast of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the intertidal habitat is much harsher, for it is exposed to the
28 c '
26
so 52
H
-*
Iran
. ~ . ~ ,. - ~ . .
. . . '. . ~...;
.. .
'.; ';
58
maximum of twelve feet at
the northern end of the
Gulf, off the coast of
Kuwait.I?
Rainfall in the region
is negligible, and the only
significant influx of fresh
water comes from the
Figure 2 Surface currents and circulation processes Tigris and Euphrates
rivers, which drain into the northern Gulf through the Shatt al-Arab, The net loss of water, caused
by the high evaporation rate, creates a reverse-flow estuarine circulation pattern similar to that of
the Mediterranean Sea.18 The circulation in the northern Gulf is primarily wind-driven. Outflow
from the Shatt al-Arab is carried by the counter-clockwise current down the coast of Kuwait and
l6Charles R.C. Sheppard, "Physical Environment of the Gulf Relevant to Marine Pollution: An Overview,"
Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993) : 5.
17/bid, 7. The range of tide is important because, in contrast to the relatively rapid removal of oil from
exposed beaches with a high energy environment, oil spills in estuarine areas have a much more drastic impact and
the effects are much longer lasting. Randolph E. Jordan and James R. Payne, fate and Weatherjng of Petroleum
Spills in the Marine Enyiromuent (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Science Publishers Inc., 1980), 104. The Gulf as a
whole is a fairly low-energy environment.
I8R. Michael Reynolds, "Physical Oceanography of the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman --
Results from the MI. Mitchell Expedition," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 35.
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Saudi Arabia. The shallow, enclosed water fluctuates as much as 24 C according to the seasonst?
and, because of evaporation, has an average salinity of 40 parts per thousand, which is
significantly higher than is normal in the open ocean)O The surrounding land is an arid desert
swept by fierce winds. The shamal, a cold northerly wind that blows during the winter, can reach
speeds of 65 mph, bringing temperatures down near freezing and whipping up 30 foot seas.u
Species which are not capable of adapting to these extremes of temperature and salinity do not long
survive in the Gulf, and those that do live in the Gulf are finely attuned to the specialized
conditions.
Another reason for the low biologic diversity in the Gulf is the relative youth of the biotic
community. During the Pleistocene era, some 20,000 years ago, the Gulf completely dried out,
and was only refilled and reconnected with the Indian Ocean during the Holocene.22 A.R.G.
Price, a scientist who has done extensive research in the region, concluded that "the condition of
low diversity in the Gulf is probably also enhanced by recruitment problems from the Indian
Ocean. Cold water upwelling in the Arabian Sea, and extensive areas without suitable 'stepping
stones' of hard substrate, separate the entrance of the Gulf from the high diversity reef areas in the
Indian Ocean."23 The Gulf reefs are to the north, off the coast of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
The shallow depth of the Gulf allows light to penetrate to the bottom, promoting a high
level of plankton production. Before the war, the seagrass beds, scattered coral reefs, and
limestone reefs covered with algae sustained a rich commercial fishery and an active shrimping
19Stephen L. Coles and Yusef H. Fadlallah , "Reef Coral Survival and Mortality at Low Temperatures in the
Arabian Gulf: New Species-Specific Lower Temperature Limits," Coral Reefs 9 (1991): 234.
20In the shallows near shore the salinity stands at around 80 parts per thousand. In the stagnant lagoons it
may soar 1O 200 parts per thousand. Charles Sheppard and Andrew Price, "Will Marine Life Survive the Gulf War?"
New Scientist, 9 March 1991,37.
21Eugene A. Shinn, "Coral Reef Recovery in Florida and the Persian Gulf," Enyironmental Geology 1 (1976):
252.
22Sheppard, "Physical Environment of the Gulf," supra note 16, at 4.
23A.R.G. Price, et al., "The Gulf: IlS Biological Setting," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 11.
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industry.24 Sardine, anchovy, mackerel and barracuda are the main pelagic species taken by the
fishery, though trawlers take a variety of demersal fish where the seabed is sufficiently flat.25
Total recorded Gulf landings reached a peak of 17,000 tons in 1967-68, but recruitment
fluctuations, combined with overcapitalization and the social side effects of the Iran/Iraq war,
drove the yield down to 4,000 tons per year during the 1980s.26 However, the year prior to the
Iraq/Kuwait war showed the highest landings for a decade. In addition to the recorded landings of
the commercial fishery, there was also a flourishing artisanal fleet, fishing both for shrimp and for
fin fish from wooden dhows using cone-shaped baskets, cast-nets, and simple gill nets and long-
lines.27
Seagrasses are particularly common in the shallow coastal areas, where they support sea
cows, green turtles, some urchins and fish, as well as juvenile pearl oysters. Some of the Gulf s
marine life, such as the green turtles and the sea cows, are considered to be endangered species.28
The offshore islands of Karan and lana are important breeding grounds for both the green and the
hawksbill turtles. Several species of dolphins and whales have been recorded in the Gulf,
including Bryde's whale and the humpback whale. In addition to these marine species, many
species of birds inhabit the region. The Gulf is the destination of several migratory species of
birds, including cormorants, grebes, flamingoes and herons. Each year some two million birds
24Congress, Oversight Hearing on Ecoterrorism, supra note 15, at 10. Though the reefs are not pivotal to the
health of the ecosystem, they playa part in maintaining the biodiversity of the region and provide some protection
against tidal erosion for a number of the cays and islands that are important breeding grounds for turtles and seabirds.
The salt marshes are also important breeding and spawning grounds. The mangroves stabilize soft marine substrates
and provide a habitat for invertebrates. Sheppard, "Will Marine Life Survive the Gulf War?" supra note 20, at 37.
25Martyn Bramwell, ed., The Rand McNally Atlas of the Oceans (New York: Rand McNally and Company,
1978), 148.
26C.P. Mathews, et al., "Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the 1991 Gulf War on Saudi Arabian
Prawn Stocks," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 253.
27For a detailed description of species taken off the coast of Kuwait, see Katsuzo Kuronuma and Abe
Yoshitaka, Fishes of the Arabian Gulf (Tokyo: The International Academic Printing Co ., Ltd., 1986). A total of
465 species of fishes are identified in the book, which includes photographs and maps. See also Katsuzo Kuronuma
and Abe Yoshitaka, Fishes of Kuwait (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd ., 1972).
28Congress, Oversight Hearing on Ecoterrorism, supra note 15, at 121.
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winter in the Gulf.29 The Gulf is also an important feeding area for migrants which winter further
south, and during the spring months, these birds supplement the numbers of wintering birds. The
intertidal mud flats provide vital feeding areas for the waders, the most important migrants in the
Gulf.30 In many ways, the Gulf acts as a rainforest for the region, providing a carbon sink,
producing oxygen, and influencing temperature, wind, and the precious rainfall. Of more
immediate importance to the people of the area is the fact that over half of the fresh water on the
island of Bahrain and as much as 80 percent of the fresh water in Saudi Arabia is produced by
desalination plants which take in water from the Gulf)1
But this is by no means a pristine environment. The discovery of oil during the 1930s
brought immense economic wealth to the region, which led to a corresponding development boom,
with all of its attendant environmental ills: water pollution, air pollution, overfishing, landfilling,
and dredging)2 Up to 60 percent of the world's marine transport of oil originates in the Gulf, and
during "rush hour" one ship moves through the Straits of Hormuz every six minutes.ss Beach tar
levels in the Gulf are by far the highest recorded in the world, and studies before the war indicated
that 80 percent of the oil pollution in the region originated from tanker and ship traffic and offshore
production. Other fOnTIS of pollution, including plastic containers, tires and scrap metal were
recorded at 87 percent of the coastal sites studied.H
29Bamaby, "Environmental Impact of the Gulf War," supra note 14, at 170.
30A.R.G. Price, et al., "The Gulf: Its Biological Setting," supra note 23, at 13.
31A.R.G. Price and e.R.e. Sheppard, "The Gulf: Past, Present and Possible Future States," Marine
Pollution Bulletin 22 (1991): 223.
32About 40 percent of the Saudi Arabian shoreline has already been subjected to dredging, or Iandfilling, or
both. Greater areas have been affected by the resulting higher levels of sedimentation. Sheppard, "Will Marine Life
Survive the Gulf War?" supra note 20, at 39.
33Reynolds, "The Physical Oceanography of the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman -- Results
from the Mt MitchellExpedition," supra note 18, at 35.
34E.I. Hamilton, ed., "Occurrence of Tar and Other Pollution on the Saudi Arabian Shores of the Gulf,
Marine Pollution Bulletin 18 (1989): 650.
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B. The Spill
The first hint of the catastrophe came at a press briefing on the 22nd of January, 1991.
Allied military officials reported that Iraq had set fire to two Kuwaiti oil refineries and an oil field
near Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia.x On the 24th of January, Saudi authorities reported that
two oil slicks were moving south off the coast of Kuwait.36 The next day, U.S. government
officials revealed further details of the spill. They said they had determined that the spill originated
at the offshore Sea Island terminal as result of Iraqi sabotage, and accused the Iraqis of also
scuttling five oil tankers anchored at Mina Ahmadi and spilling their oil into the Persian Gulf.s?
In February the Iraqis sabotaged the ports of Mina Ahmadi, Abu Halifa and Shuaiba,
spilling more oil into the water. They also dug long trenches along the coast and filled them with
oil.38 Even after the war, the oil continued to pour into the Gulf as the land wells that had been
dynamited spewed oil, some of which caught fire and the rest of which collected into lakes that
35William Arkin, Damian Durrant, and Marianne Cherni, On Impact: Modem Wartare and the Environment.
A Case Study of the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace, 1991),62 [hereinafter Arkin, et al., On Impact]. On
January 24th the Los Angeles Times carried only a brief note on the spill in its afternoon edition: "Baghdad Radio
said allied planes had struck two Iraqi tankers in the Persian Gulf on Tuesday and that 'large quantities' of oil had
spilled into the sea. Saudi authorities confirmed that two oil slicks were moving south off the coast of Kuwait."
Yet other sources say that the spill actually began on the 19th. SeeC.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the
Gulf War, supranote 2, at 1. These conflicting reports serve to illustrate the difficulty in obtaining accurate
information about events in a hot war zone.
36The Los Angeles Times, 24 January 1991, Al (untitled, no byline given).
37Thomas W. Lippman and William Booth, "Oil Spreading Off Kuwait Poses Ecological Disaster,"~
Washington Post, 26 January 1991, p. Al and A16. See also Rick Atkinson and Dan Balz , "Iraq dumping Flood of
Oil into Gulf," The Washington post, 26 January 1991, Al and A14. This is not the first time that Iraq has
deliberately spilled oil into the Gulf during hostilities. During the Iran/Iraq war, Iraqi air attacks damaged an Iranian
offshore oil installation that had previously been damaged by weather and was already leaking in the Nowruz oil field
about 40 miles from Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal. See "Iraq Says Its Navy Units Destroyed Iran Oil Rigs and 5
Ships in Gulf," New York Times, 3 March 1983, A4.
38The Iraqis may have intended to set the oil in the trenches alight to create a wall of fire to hamper advancing
Coalition land forces, but whether through breakdown in military communication or for other unknown reasons, the
trenches were never set on fire. See also Jennifer Parmalee, "Kuwaiti Emir Snuffs Out Last Iraqi-Lit Oil Fire,"
Washington Post, 7 November 1991, Al (noting that the oil wells were set ablaze by retreating Iraqi soldiers).
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also drained into the Gulf until the bulldozer crews supporting the fire-fighting activity built levees
to dam the black flood.w
By the time the final numbers were tallied, the slick had spread over 600 square miles of
water and fouled 300 miles of coastline.w In addition to the extensive damage to the marine
ecosystem, 780 oil wells on land had been damaged, and over 500 set ablaze."!
C. The Predicted Damages
As the scientific community began to realize the enormity of the disaster, eminent
researchers in many different fields began the task of estimating the potential damage. Initially
there was some fear that the pall of soot from the burning oil fires might rise high enough to affect
atmospheric circulation and disrupt regional weather patterns such as the Indian monsoon .s- One
report speculated that the soot cloud could cover as much as 20 to 40 percent of the northern
hemisphere, causing abnormally cool temperatures, drought, and crop failures world-wide.O
Marine biologists were concerned about the fate of surface swimmers and feeders, such as
seabirds, waders, marine mammals and reptiles. Pollution of the seagrass beds, which serve as
39As late as mid-April of 1991, crude oil was still spilling into the gulf at the rate of about 3,000 barrels a
day, an amount equivalent to one Exxon-Valdez spill every 12 weeks. Michael Ross, "Experts Blame Saudis,
Kuwaitis, as Spill, Oil Fires Go Unchecked," The Los Angeles Times , 12 April 1991, AI0.
40Roy Popkin, "Responding to Eco-Terrorism," EPA Journal 17 (1991): 25. Compare this to the estimated
size of the Nowruz spill from the IranlIraq war, which went unchecked for two months, during which time the four
uncapped wells were dumping oil into the Gulf at the rate of an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 barrels daily . Robert D.
McFadden, "Major Damage Feared in Persian Gulf Oil Spill," The New York Times. 3 April 1983, A7. One news
magazine intimated that the initial estimates were "exaggerated assessments made for the purpose of putting Saddam
Hussein's acts of ecoterrorism in the worst possible light," and reported the Saudi estimates at one half to three
million barrels of oil. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "A Man-Made Hell on Earth," Time, 18 March 1991, 36-37.
41Congress, Oyersi~ht Hearin~ on Ecoterrorism, supra note 15, at 69.
42Sharon Begley, "Saddam's Ecoterror,' Newsweek, 4 February 1991,39. Carl Sagan made a well-publici zed
prediction that smoke from the oil fires could rise into the stratosphere and blanket the globe, according to Philip
Elmer-Dewitt, "A Man-Made Hell on Earth," supra note 40, at 36.
43K.S. Ramachandran, ed., Gulf War and Enyiromnenlal Problems (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House,
1991), 109.
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nursery and spawning grounds for shrimp, would undoubtedly have an adverse impact on the local
fisheries; the question was, how much damage would be done to the once-flourishing industry?
Concerns that the spill would affect amphibious operations during the war were quickly
dismissed.s- but there was an admitted possibility that, despite protective booms and installed
filters, the oil might damage industrial facilities such as the desalination plants that provided the
fresh water for the Coalition ground troops stationed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.t> No
one had ever seen an oil spill of this magnitude in such a confined body of water, and no one knew
quite what the impact would be on man or the environment. It also quickly became apparent that
no one knew quite how to clean up the mess.
44R.W. Apple, "Iraq Dumps Kuwaiti Oil Into Gulf," The New York Times, 26 January 1991, AI.
45Kim Murphy and Charles P. Wallace, "Allies Rally to Curb Oil Spill," supra note 8, at 27. During the
Nowruz oil spill, the Saudi Arabians temporarily closed one desalination plant. At that time, there were 26 plants in
operation to supplement the artesian wells that provided fresh water, William E. Farrell, "Gulf Clashes Imperil Oil
Spill Cleanup," New York Times, 12 April 1983, A3.
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II. The Environmental Impact
A. The Clean-up Effort
Immediately after a spill, the oil spreads out on the sea surface to form a thin slick. The
lighter (low molecular weight) fractions, which make up about 40 percent of the oil, will evaporate
rapidly.sv How quickly the immiscible components become emulsified depends on the water
turbulence, which in tum
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Figure 3 Time-course offactors affecting oil spills
absorbs particles
suspended on the surface to form tar balls, some of which sink to the seabed, and some of which
may be washed ashore.se An oil slick does not remain stationary, but travels slowly downwind.s?
46It is estimated that evaporation would account for approximately 25 percent of the spilled oil over the first
ten days. Dissolution could remove 5 percent during the same time frame. Petrochemical reactions can remove
another 5 percent over 10 to a 100 days. Microbial degradation accounts for 30 percent of the oil, but takes from 50
to 500 days. Disintegration and sinking account for 15 percent on a 100 to 1000 day time scale. The residual
materials. which constituted approximately 20 percent of the total, were estimated to remain on the surface as tar
balls for hundreds of days . Jordan and Payne, Fate and Weatherin~ of Petroleum Spj1]s in the Marine Enyironment
supranote 17. at 127.
47R.B. Clark. Marine pollution (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989),42-43.
48Tar balls at sea can be expected to break up and sink within a year. in some part because they are colonized
by marine organisms such as barnacles that weight them down and provide nutrients to spur microbial degradation of
the tar. The decomposition of stranded or beached tar balls is more complicated. It is "dependent on the shoreline
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It does relatively little damage at sea, but once it reaches the nearshore environment, it can have a
devastating environmental--and economic-Impact. Furthermore, once it comes ashore, cleaning
the beaches is a difficult, expensive, time-consuming and labor-intensive process.w Clearly, it is
preferable to tackle the spill before it reaches land. Because petroleum is lighter than water, it can
be contained by floating booms extending as little as three feet below the surface. Once the oil is
corralled by booms , skimming equipment can be used to scoop up the oil. Some of the crude may
even be salvaged as kerosene.n Alternatively, once the spill is boomed, it can be bumed.52 But
all of these techniques work best in the early days of the spill, before the oil begins to separate.
Every major pollution incident, from the Torrey Canyon to the Exxon Valdez, has hammered home
substrate, the energy regime of the shoreline environment, and the rate of sedimentation within the intertidal zone .
Microbial degradation of tar balls is generally limited to the outer surfaces due to diffusion-limited transport of
oxygen and nutrients to the interior." James R. Payne and Charles R. Phillips, Petroleum Spills in the Marine
Environment: The Chemistry and Formation of Water-in-Qil Emulsions and Tar Balls, (Chelsea: Lewis Publishers,
Inc., 1985), 119.
49There are a number of increasingly-sophisticated computer modeling systems available for predicting oil
spill trajectory and fate. For a brief description of one such system, see Eric Anderson, et al., "The Alyeska Tactical
Oil Spill Model," Marine Technology Society Journal 24 (1990): 33-38.
50()ne would rather "deal with" the spill out at sea, preferably by booming a damaged vessel and recovering as
much of the cargo as possible with skimmers, a course of action obviously impracticable in the case of the Gulf war
oil spill. The natural process of emulsification of oil in water can be speeded up by spraying chemical dispersants
on the oil slick, but that method is chiefly useful for treating small quantities of fresh oil. The Gulf spill was far
too massive to make the use of dispersants a cost-effective option, even had aircraft or small boats been able to enter
the spill zone safely to deliver the chemicals. R.B. Clark, Marine Poilution, supra note 47, at 45. Thus the Saudi
and Coalition officials were forced to take reactive rather Ulan proactive steps to protect the desalination plants and
beaches.
51Michael D. Lemonick, "Dead Sea in the Making,"~ 11 February 1991,40. This facile description
conceals some fundamental technological problems that face anyone attempting to deal with a large oil spill at sea
"The chain of events that must proceed smoothly in oil spill controb-containment, transfer, storage, and disposal--
suffers from several uniformly weak links. Oil spill containment operations are often hampered by poor visibility,
high winds, strong surface currents, and elevated sea state. Transfer operations frequently break down when oil
viscosity increases beyond the design capability of available pumps. Emulsification can readily increase the volume
of spilled oil beyond the capacity of available tankage." Charles N. Ehler , "NOAA Viewpoints on Management and
Legislative Implications of Recent Oil Spills," Marine Technology Society Journal 24 (1990): 24.
52Experiments with controlled burning of oil slicks has shown that oil may bum with 50 to 95 percent
removal rations, as long as emulsification has not occurred. Computer modeling and analysis of airborne pollutants
indicate that dioxins and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH compounds are known to be toxic to man) are not
generated as a result of combustion. For additional discussion on methods of oil spill containment and clean-up, see
Edward Tennyson, "Results from Selected Oil Spill Response Research by the Minerals Management Service,"
Marine Technology Society Journal 24 (1990): 31.
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the lesson that whatever you intend to do about the oil, you must do it quickly, before the oil
emulsifies into the sticky, intractable brown mousse. But in the case of the Persian Gulf spill, nine
days went by before the Saudi Arabian Meteorology and Environmental Protection Administration
established a regional office to coordinate response to the spill. 53 By then, the oil was already
washing ashore on the beaches south of Kuwait.
When the coastline is indented by many small bays and headlands, such as the Alaskan
headlands, leaving areas of relatively
damaged shoreline by species from the
shoreline in the vicinity of Prince William
Sound, the oil tends to come ashore at the
from Kuwait as far south as Abu Ali
less affected areas .54 But the coastline
Island, the Gulf coastline is flat and
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53C.R.S., The Environmental Aftennath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 39. This lack of coordination
should not have come as a surprise to anyone who was involved with the clean-up efforts subsequent to the Nowruz
spill in 1983. See William E. Farrell, "Persian Gulf Countries Fail Again On a Pack for Combating Oil Spill,"
The New York Times. 8 April 1983, A12, and his follow-up article , "Gulf Clashes Imperil Oil Spill Cleanup," The.
New York Times, supra note 46, at A3. The delay is understandable when considering that, "in contrast to the post-
Exxon Valdez Alaska where there was a single focused response activity, Saudi Arabia was juggling many important
'functions: serving as base for Allied military operations, protecting citizens and industry from attack, and trying to
respond to one of the largest oil spills in history. Response personnel were hampered by having to wear protective
gas masks and clothing, by being restricted in travel and access, and hampered by the lack of weather data and spill
trajectories. It was not to be a conventional 'text book' spill response ." C.R.S., The Environmental Aftennath of
the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 40.
54T.M. Hawley, Aaainst the Fires of Hell: The Environmental Disaster of the Gulf War (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 116.
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blanketed miles of coastline in a sticky black goo that flowed unimpeded from one shallow, wide-
mouthed bay to the next.
In addition to the vulnerable nature of the coastline, there were other factors that made
clean-up difficult. The most important, at least in the beginning, was the war. Certain
information, such as satellite images of the area and crucial meteorological data, was classified in
order to protect military interests.55 Overflights were not begun until the spill was ten days old,
and they were limited to the southernmost edge of the spill--the edge furthest from the "hot war"
zone. The Coast Guard's AIREYE system, which has been used successfully in the past to
provide a multidimensional analysis of oil spills, was not activated until mid-February, a month
after the oil was released.56 The temporary restrictions on data hampered oil experts attempting to
track the spill's movement and make preparations to protect the vital desalination plants and deal
with the oil when it came ashore. Even after the war officially ended, the floating mines and live
ordnance continued to endanger clean-up workers.57
A second major obstacle in the containment and cleanup process was the depth of the
Persian Gulf. It was difficult to maneuver the oil spill recovery vessels designed for operation in
open seas in the shallow Gulf, where the water might be only three feet deep as much as a mile
away from land. 58 A third major barrier in getting at the spill was the beach terrain itself, which
was mainly comprised of sabkha, or porous quicksand.t? The sand not only made it dangerous to
operate bulldozers and other heavy equipment along the beach, but it also soaked up the oil like a
55Congress, Oversight Hearing on Ecoterrorism, supra note 15, at 21.
56C.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 41.
57Bob Caron, the first EPA staff member to go to the Gulf after the oil spill, said, "We knew how to deal
with oil spills, but we also knew we couldn't apply many of the techniques we used in Prince William Sound
because there were Iraqi mines somewhere under that oil slick, and we didn't want the crews of the skimmers or those
placing the booms to be the ones to find them." Popkin, "Responding to Eco-Terrorism," supra note 40, at 24.
58Congress, Oversight Hearin:; on Ecoierrorism. supra note 15, at 41.
59Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1991),66.
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sponge as it came ashore and allowed it to seep deep into the sediments. Finally, there was
tremendous difficulty in getting the needed equipment to the region. As the United States
discovered in dealing with the Exxon Valdez spill, having the right equipment readily available is
essential to being able to cope with a major spill.60 U.S. corporations and government agencies
who attempted to respond to the spill were left with the impression that the Saudi Arabian
government did not place a high priority on funding spill response , and they concluded that this
lack of financial commitment was a contributing factor in the disorganized and ineffective clean-up
effort. 61
Despite these handicaps, the clean-up crews managed to rig effective protective booms
around the vital desalination plants that provide much of the potable water for Saudi Arabia.
Western observers were dismayed that little else was done, but then, the Gulf region does not have
a tourist industry, per se, and the Arab culture places little importance on pristine beaches and
unsullied wetlands . The principle focus of the clean-up teams in Saudi Arabia was very straight-
forward; protect the desalination plants and recover as much oil as possible for commercial
purposes. 62
If a large quantity of oil is stranded and the shore is accessible by mechanized vehicles,
much of the oil can be pumped into tank trucks and removed, as was done on the beaches in
6OFor a brief description of the oil spill recovery techniques attempted during the clean-up of the Exxon Valdez
spill, and an analysis in layman's terms of the available technology for dealing with such environmental disasters,
see Lee Clarke, "Oil-Spill Fantasies," The Atlantic Monthly (November 1990): 65-77.
61C.R.S. , Oyersillht Hearing on Ecoterrorism, supra note 2, at 3. Brent Blackwelder, vice president of Friends
of the Earth, noted that Exxon spent more than $2 billion and enlisted more than 11,000 people in its efforts to
clean up the Exxon Valdez disaster, which dumped 260,000 barrels of oil into Prince William Sound. By
comparison, some 400 people and $60 million were allocated to deal with the much larger Persian Gulf spill. Ross,
"Experts Blame Saudis, Kuwaitis, as Spill, Oil Fires Go Unchecked," supranote 39, at 10.
62Saudi Aramco, the national oil company, laid down 25 miles of booms to protect tanker terminals,
refineries and desalination plants, and mobilized 21 oil-recovery vehicles. Thomas Y. Canby, "After the Storm,"
National Geollwhic 180 (August 1991): 17. Tony Preen, an Australian biologist who was invited by the Saudis
to work with the Meteorological and Environmental Protection Administration (MEPA), was quoted as saying,
"Every coastal installation bas been protected with multiple lines of booms. Yet we haven't been able to deploy a
single meter of boom to protect natural habitats." lbid., 28.
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Brittany in the aftermath of the Amoco Cadiz spill. 63 If the oil is not removed from the beaches,
each succeeding tide will lift the oil and spread it further along the shoreline. But even if some of
the oil can be recovered in this manner, a considerable amount will still soak into the substratum,
and be left clinging to the rocks, or seeping into crannies. It may be removed by high-pressure
hoses, high-pressure steam, or chemical dispersants, but these methods often kill the fragile
creatures of the intertidal habitat.e- 'Treatment is often more damaging to the fauna and flora than
the oil itself," concluded one scientist.ee
Between February of 1991 and May of 1992 a number of experimental clean-up techniques
were employed on intertidal habitats in the Persian Gulf. Techniques included high-pressure
flushing with seawater at ambient temperatures, low-pressure flushing, dry rotavating to break up
the tar layer,66 rotovating in combination with flushing to release oil trapped in sediments, and
auto-flushing with high pressure revolving water jets. The researchers also applied mechanical
removal and replacement of oiled sand on Karan island, an extreme method entailing some
environmental risk but made necessary by the imminent breeding season for the turtles and terns on
the island.e? The researchers concluded that dry rotovation of the sandy mud flats caused long-
63Tben, of course, one must decide what to do wilh the oil-contaminated debris. "A few tonnes of oil can
easily results in hundreds of tonnes of oily sand , pebbles, and other debris, and disposal of this material presents a
serious problem. II cannot be incinerated unless the oil content is very high; it is usually unsuitable for dumping on
waste tips because of the risk of the oil leaching oul and contaminating water courses; and oil refineries cannot deal
with it ... at present tipping on waste dumps where the oil can be contained appears to be the only practicable, if
unsatisfactory, solution. " Clark, Marine Pollulion, supranote 60, al47.
64"ln the Exxon VaLdez spill, the use of increasingly aggressive measures LO remove weathered oil was
thought by NOAA scientists on-scene to be counterproductive during lie later stages of the spill cleanup last year.
Few, if any, biological communities withstood the high temperature and pressure of the Omni-barge washing
system." Ehler, "NOAA Viewpoints on Management and Legislative Implications of Recent Oil Spills," supra note
60, at 25.
65Clark, Marine Pollulion, supra note 60, al45.
66Rolovaling - using a rototiller, a motorized devise having spinning blades perpendicular to the ground and
arranged like spokes, LO break up the soil.
671ainWalt, Timothy Woodhouse and David A. Jones, "Intertidal Clean-up Activities and Natural
Regeneration on the Gulf Coast of Saudi Arabia from 199110 1992 after the 1991 Gulf Oil Spill," Marine PoJlulion
Bulletin 27 (1993): 326-327.
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term disturbance to the sediments that could be mitigated by combining it with low-pressure high-
volume seawater flushing, but that the attendant damage from the heavy machinery may outweigh
the expected benefits. High-pressure flushing of rocky shores was found to have deleterious
effects on the surviving and resettling fauna. All in all, the researchers concluded that "there is
little to indicate any biological improvement on the trial clean-up sites over the natural recovery
process taking place elsewhere in the impacted area. However, it is clear that in some cases natural
recovery could be encouraged by certain cleaning activities such as removal of the tar mats from the
upper intertidal zone."68
B. The Environmental Assessment
Essentially all of the floating crude oil had been removed from the water by the end of July,
1991,69 but because the Gulf has such a wide intertidal range and experiences such a small amount
of wave action, the oil settled deeply into the beach sediments. A year after the spill , a writer for
National Geographic visited the Gulf and noted, "I was impressed by the apparent good health of
the sea grasses, despite soft oil amid their roots, but dismayed by glimpses of dead mollusks,
crabs, and other creatures."70 The writer also noted that there was new grass growing along the
shoreline, and small fish sheltering in the empty shells of the mollusks killed by the initial influx of
oil.
A more detailed scientific study was conducted between February and June of 1992 by
more than 140 marine scientists from 15 nations. The study was sponsored by the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the Regional Organization for the Protection
68/bid ., 330.
69Sheppard, "Physical Environment of the Gulf Relevant to Marine Pollution," supra note 16, at 6.
70Sylvia A. Earle, "Persian Gulf Pollution: Assessing the Damage One Year Later ,' Nalional Geographic
181 (February 1992): 133.
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of the Marine Environment (ROPME), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the
Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, which provided the ship Mt. Mitchell to serve as laboratory and living quarters for
the scientists.U
The scientists aboard the Mt .Mitchell conducted detailed studies of a number of intertidal
habitats along the Saudi Arabian coast, which revealed a strong correlation between the
geomorphology of the nearshore environment and the persistence of oil in the intertidal area.72
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Figure 5 Field sketch showing extensive asphalt pavement from previous spill
Beneath the relatively clean sand on the beachface was a 15-20 em thick layer of coarse-grained
bubble sand heavily saturated with oil. In some places, they found multiple buried layers of oily
sand. The relict asphalt pavement from the 1983 Nowruz spill was still visible, extending in a
continuous layer up to 40 meters wide for 20 kilometers along the beach at Abu Ali.73
71Robert C. Clark, Jr., and Lisa C. Symons, "Mt. Mitchell Oceanographic Expedition in the Gulf,"~
Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 31.
72Miles O. Hayes, et al.,"Distribution and Weathering of Shoreline Oil One Year After the Gulf War Oil
Spill," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 135.
FigUT.Qb,3., 137.
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The researchers concluded that where beach morphology was similar to that of Abu Ali Island, the
Gulf War spill would eventually harden into a similar asphalt pavement. As one might expect, they
also found that the mudflats and marshes at the heads of sheltered bays were the areas most
severely impacted by the wartime spill. In some places, there was no sign of living epibiota in the
mid to upper tidal areas, even though their study was conducted a year after the spill occurred.t-
In other areas, the combination of prevailing north westerly winds and southerly currents, strong
wave action and longshore drift seem to have weathered, broken up and dissipated the tar, leaving
very little on those exposed sandy beaches. 75
In one study area, 50 percent of the intertidal vegetation of the salt marshes died as a result
of the oil spill. The tar layer changed the soil characteristics and inhibited the penetration of water
and the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide. Reduced evaporation, combined with increased
energy absorption on the black surface, increased the surface temperatures and stressed the marsh
plants beyond their capacity to survive.?« Within the coastline of Ras as Zwar to Abu Ali Island
approximately 30 percent of the mangrove trees died. On the other hand, wherever oil was
removed from the plants and soils by saltwater irrigation or sprinkling, the plants survived. The
major determinant in Avicennia marina, the only mangrove species occurring naturally in the Gulf,
seemed to be whether the pneurnatophores?? were completely oiled, or not. Where the
74/bid., 139.
75Iain Watt, el al., "Intertidal Clean-up Activities," supra note 67, at 330.
76Friedhelm Krupp and David. A. Jones, "The Creation of a Marine Sanctuary after the 1991 Gulf War Oil
Spill," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 318.
77Pneumatophores are specialized structures developed from the root in certain plants growing in swamps and
marshes, serving as respiratory organs. Mangroves live in anoxic muds, and have extensive air spaces that carry
oxygen to the submerged part of the tree. If the pneumatophores are clogged with oil, the oxygen level in the root
air spaces falls to 1-2 percent normal within two days . Reynolds, "Physical Oceanography of the Gulf," supranote
18, at 51.
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pneumatophores were only partially oiled, some mangroves were able to develop branched
pneumatophores and new aerial roots.78
In late 1992, surveys were undertaken on nearshore and offshore reefs in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. The researchers reported that "in terms of general health, Kuwait's reefs appeared
no different than in 1991 or during the 1980s. However, there had been limited mortalities of a
few species since the 1991 survey, affecting different reefs in different ways."79 In Saudi Arabia,
the reefs studies appeared to be in good condition, except for one reef that had suffered severe
damage from the anchors and nets of fishing dhows. Even at that site, there was evidence of
vigorous recruitment and continued growth of juvenile coral colonies.80 At all the reefs visited,
except Abu Ali and Kubbar, the fish were abundant and communities appeared to be healthy.
While admitting that the Gulf war spill offered the most convenient and popular explanation for the
coral mortalities and decline of some fish communities,81 the researchers pointed out that natural
oil seepages were common in the region, and that at least some of the ecosystem stress could have
been caused by the lower than average water temperatures during the 1991/1992 winter, which
could have been caused by insulation from the smoke plume of the burning wells. Hampered by a
lack of historical data with which to make detailed comparisons, the scientists could only conclude
78Benno Boer, "Anomalous Pneumatophores and Adventitious Roots of Avicennia Marina (Forssk.) Vierh.
Mangroves Two Years After the 1991 Gulf War Oil Spill in Saudi Arabia," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993):
208-209.
79Nigel Downing and Callum Roberts, "Hal) the Gulf War Affected Coral Reefs of the Northwestern Gulf?"
Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 150. For example, "it is a reasonable assumption that damage to the reef at
Qit'at Urayfijan was caused by fresh crude oil flowing over the reef for a period of days . Yet, the Getty reef showed
no signs whatever of stress even though it lies about a mile away from a heavily oiled beach, and directly
downstream of the points of oil release." Ibid., 155.
80Ibid" 151.
81Emigration from the reef site was "discounted as a possible cause, since these reefs are surrounded by
unprotected sandy areas where reef fish would immediately fall victim to predators . during cold winters like 1991192,
most reef fish die off. , . for this reason, many species of reef fish occurred only as juveniles or subadults
throughout 1992. Water temperatures were much higher during the winter of 1992/93. There was also a decrease in
visible reef fish populations, but many fish probably hid in the reef and started re-emerging with rising water
temperatures ," Krupp and Jones, "The Creation of a Marine Sanctuary after the 1991 Gulf War Oil Spill," supra
note 76, at 320 .
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that natural fluctuations in the coral reef community may have masked any impact of the Gulf
War.82
Whatever cause is proposed, be it oil sheens, temperature decreases, reduced insolation or
combinations of them all, it must have affected each reef and its coral community in
different ways ... We certainly do not dismiss the possibility that Gulf war pollution
played some role in the observed coral mortalities and decreased fish abundance.
However, we think it highly unlikely that this was the only cause, and quite possibly it may
have had a minor influence compared to background environmental factors.83
The oil spills were estimated to have killed some 30,000 wintering seabirds, mainly grebes
and cormorants. However, high numbers of juvenile birds found in 1992 and 1993 winter
surveys make it appear that population recovery is ongoing and the oil spills did not diminish any
populations below viable levels.e- The winter wader population was estimated to be about two
thirds less than pre-war levels, and that could be attributed to lost food supply as well as to the
presence of the oil. The pollution of the intertidal flats and the die-off of the invertebrate
populations caused a major reduction in the wader carrying capacity of the Saudi Coast85 The tern
populations escaped major short-term damage from the spill, primarily because the spill occurred
before the terns arrived at their winter breeding grounds in the Gulf. 86
Seagrasses which live in the shallow subtidal areas provide critical habitats for many
species of invertebrates, fish and wildlife. Cautioning that difficulties in establishing replicate
sampling and an unimpacted baseline, common problems faced by researchers trying to ascertain
the impact of the Gulf oil spill, scientists nevertheless concluded that seagrasses in the
82Downing and Roberts, supra note 79, at 155.
»tu«. 155.
84Symens, P. and A. Suhaibani, "The Impact of the Gulf War Oil Spills on Wintering Seabird Populations
along the Northern Arabian Gulf Coast of Saudi Arabia," SandgfOuse 14 (1993) (in press), quoted in M.l. Evans, et
al., "Short-term Damage to Coastal Bird Populations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Following the 1991 Gulf War
Marine Pollution," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 158.
85Evans, "Short-term damage to Coastal Bird Populations," supra note 84, at 159.
86/bid., 160.
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northwestern Gulf had not experienced acute or long-term degradation from the oil spill.s? This
conclusion was based on quantitative and qualitative observations of the distribution, abundance,
and net production of three species along an axis from a clean outer bay site to the heavily oiled
inner bay sites. Damage to the algae mats was concentrated on the upper intertidal zone, and the
worst damage was to algae in sheltered habitats, which correlated with the studies showing the
correlation between geomorphology and the persistence of oil in the mudflats and marshes at the
heads of sheltered bays.88
A detailed assessment of historical data available on the prawn fishery and the status of the
prawn stocks in the northern Gulf revealed that in 1991 the Saudi Arabian prawn landings
decreased substantially, and of those prawns landed, a very low proportion were sexually mature
adults.89 The researchers concluded that absence of eggs and low number of larvae during April
of 1992, a period known to be at or close to the norrnal peak in spawning, provided confirmation
that recruitment did collapse in spring 1991.90They concluded that despite the lack of population
data on seasonal fluctuations in population size and lack of critical environmental and population
data from August 1990 until late 1991, the only likely cause for the failure of the previously
flourishing fishery was the "complex pollution event caused by the oil fires and the oil spill."91
87W.J. Kenworthy, et al., "Ecology of Seagrasses in Northeastern Saudi Arabia One Year After the Gulf War
Oil Spill," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 213.
88Makrarn A. Gerges, "On the Impacts of the 1991 Gulf War on the Environment of the Region: General
Observations," Marine Pollution Bulletin 27 (1993): 311. This is a pattern frequently noted in research on oil
spills. Studies following a spill of Bunker-C heavy fuel oil in Nova Scotia remarked that the oil disappeared rapidly
from the rocky shore, but that the low-energy sediments of the marches were not cleaned so quickly. In this study,
the half-life, or time for half the hydrocarbon concentration to be degraded, was two years for the bay as a whole, but
up to 25 years for the fine sediments. Harold V. Thurman, Essentials of Oceanography, 3rd ed., (Columbus:
Merrill Publishing Company, 1990), 353.
89C.P. Mathews, et al., "Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the 1991 Gulf War on Saudi Arabian
Prawn Stocks," supra note 26, at 264.
90Tbe spring 1992 spawning biomass was reduced to 1-2 percent of pre-war (1988-89) levels. Landings fell
from 3700 tons in 1989 to 25 tons in February 1992. Ibid., 269.
91Ibid., 269.
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Interestingly enough, a short-term study of the major zooplankton groups did not show any change
in either distribution of mean density following the oil spill.92
A few very localized fish kills were observed, but due to a variety of reasons, among them
a desire to protect the public from the possible health hazards from eating contaminated fish,93 the
war zone was closed to fishing for almost a year.94 Artisanal fishing continued throughout the
crisis from Jubail southward along the coast of Saudi Arabia, but the bulk of the Saudi Arabian
commercial fishing fleet was ordered to the Red Sea after the crisis began to prt?vent the unarmed
boats from being caught in the hostilities.95 The infrastructure of the fishing industry in Kuwait
was devastated, but this was attributed to the widespread looting by Iraqi soldiers rather than the
oil spill or fires.96
The president of the Marine Pollution Control Corporation, David Usher, said, "Contrary
to conventional wisdom, the environmental damage as a result of the oil spill appears to be less
than anticipated. The damage in the Gulf appears to have been minimal in a sense. There have
92F.Y. AI-Yamani, et al., "Post-Spill Zooplankton Distribution in the NW Gulf," Marine Pollution Bulletin
27 (1993): 243. The researchers cautioned that "the effects of pollutants on the planktonic food chain are not
straightforward. A significant consequence of pollution could be a shift away from the normal population balance
toward a new community, with unpredictable results on the food web, possibly causing destabilization of integrated
ecosystems in the region. More studies are underway." Ibid.
93"The main concern regarding the risk to humans is the known carcinogenicity of several of the oil
components. Because of their lipophilic nature, hydrocarbons will accumulate in seafoods and can potentially be
passed on to man." National Research Council, Oil in the Sea: Inputs. Fates. and Effects, (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1985),479.
94Krupp and Jones, "The Creation of a Marine Sanctuary after the 1991 Gulf War Oil Spill," supra note 76,
at 319-320.
95Kent E. Carpenter, "Preliminary Observations on the Effects of the 1991 Gulf War on Fisheries,' M.a!:i!ll<
Pollution Bulletin 24 (May 1992),274, [hereinafter "Preliminary Observations on Fisheries"]. Saudi Arabia
followed thc same strategy during the Nowruz oil spill that occurred during the Iran/Iraq war. See Farrell, "Gulf
Clashes Imperil Oil Spill Cleanup,' supra note 45.
96()f the 35 commercial shrimp trawlers registered in Kuwait, only five could be located after the crisis.
Restaurants and other retail outlets that provide the market for fish were destroyed or closed for other reasons. The
reference libraries of the Fisheries Directorate and the Mariculture and Fisheries Department of the Kuwait Insututc
for Scientific Research lost extensive library facilities, research vessels and other equipment; setting quotas and
otherwise managing the fishery will require significant reorganization. Many of the staff members were foreign
nationals who fled the country or disappeared during the occupation. Carpenter, "Preliminary Observations on
Fisheries," supra note 45, at 274-275.
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been no catastrophic reports of environmental damage with the exception of the movement of the
shrimp fleet to the Red Sea."97 Despite the controversy over the extent of the damage and its long-
range affects, all of the scientists agreed that the Persian Gulf spill was the most devastating marine
pollution incident deliberately caused by man.
There is an old adage that says nullum crimen sine lege--there is no Clime unless there is a
law. In order to determine whether this act of deliberate pollution was a crime, one must examine
the relevant international law, and, in particular, the laws of war.
97Congress, Oyersi~ht Hearing on Ecoterrorism, supra note 15, at 41. This assessment was echoed by Edward
Owens, a coastal geologist, who said that initial reports that the spill caused an environmental catastrophe were
probably exaggerated, and that he believed "much of the concern is aesthetic, not ecological." In Joyce and Charles,
"The Battle to Stop the Gulf from Choking," supra note 2, at 20.
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III. Protection of the Environment During War
A. Historical Perspective on Environmental Damage During Waifare
A brief review of history reveals the frequent use of scorched-earth tactics in warfare. The
Romans razed the city of Carthage and salted its fields. The Chinese dynamited a major dike of the
Yellow River to stop the advance of the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945.
The ensuing floods destroyed 11 cities and more than four thousand villages, killing several
hundred thousand persons and leaving millions homeless.98 The atomic bomb not only leveled
cities and obliterated thousands of people, but it also contaminated the air and soil with radiation
that lasted for years after the war.99 Most of the environmental devastation that occurs during a
military action is viewed as incidental or collateral damage. However, when the enemy is engaged
in guerilla warfare, the environment itself is seen as a collaborator. The use of herbicides such as
Agent Orange destroyed an estimated eight percent of the croplands of South Vietnam , 14 percent
of its forests, and half of its mangrove swamps.lOO Such devastation is usually rationalized on the
grounds of military necessity in that the enemy's territory provides food, sanctuary, cover, and a
staging ground for attack.
But Saddam Hussein took the game to another level. As one journalist noted, "The Gulf War
was the first conflict in which ecoterrorism played a major role in the combatant's battle plan, and
even though the fighting lasted only 42 days, it may tum out to be the most ecologically destructive
98Remarks by Philippe Sands from the book by Arthur Westing, Warfare in a Fragile World at a panel
discussion on the environment as a weapon during the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, published in American Society of International Law Proceedings 85 (April 1991): 52.
99Malcolm W. Browne, et al., "War and the Environment," Audobon (September/October 1993): 89.
looDavid Morrison, "War on the Environment," National Journal, 2 March 1991,536.
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conflict in the history of warfare."10I
Technology is a two-edged weapon; as it becomes more sophisticated, it also increases its
potential destructive capacity. In recognition of this uncomfortable fact. periodic efforts have been
made to develop internationally-accepted standards of conduct that would put a curb on the
devastation and suffering caused in war. In the late nineteenth century, Henry Dunant, Francis
Lieber and Tsar Alexander began codifying the existing customary law, a process which led to the
numerous Geneva and Hague conventions.ice These treaties embody a significant proportion of
the currently-accepted laws of war, a fact that may be surprising, considering that those documents
are nearly a century old and are the product of a western society. Despite these efforts, however,
there is still no single statute book that can be consulted in order to determine what actions are
permissible during hostilities because international law is made up not only of formal agreements
such as treaties, but also of the proclamations and decisions of international organizations such as
the United Nations, as well as the general practices or customs of states. 103 With all these sources
to consult and compare, ferreting out the law applicable to a situation can be challenging indeed.
Conventional law is not the last word on the subject, but it is a good place to start, as treaties are
IOIElmer-Dewiu, "A Man-Made Hell on Earth," supra note 40, at 37.
I02Anthony Leibler, "Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for International Law,"
California Western International Law Journal 23 (Fall, 1992): 97 [hereinafter "Deliberate Wartime Environmental
Damage"]. Henry Dunant was caught up in the Battle of Solferino and published an account of his experiences
which led to the establishment of the International Red Cross and the first Geneva Convention. Francis Leiber
drafted the first comprehensive Code of Land Warfare during the American Civil War. Tsar Alexander II convened the
conference which produced the 1968 St. Petersburg Declaration. The latter two documents laid the foundations for
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Tsar Nicholas II was instrumental in initiating the Hague Convention of
1899. Walter G. Sharp, "The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case
Analysis of the Persian Gulf War," Military Law Reyiew 137 (Summer 1992): 7 [hereinafter "The Effective
Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict"].
103Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as annexed to the United Nations Charter sets
forth five sources of international law: conventional law, in the form of treaties, protocols, or conventions;
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted by law; the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists (writers and scholars) of
various nations. See the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Art. 38 (1)(a), 59 Statutes at
~ 1055, T.S. No. 993 reprinted inEncyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. 2nd ed.,
(London: Taylor and Francis, Ltd., 1990) [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]..
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generally recognized as being the best evidence of the will of states, and are thus considered
preeminent over customary law.l 04 A review of the chronological development of treaties
pertaining to the laws of war reveals an increasing awareness of the issue of environmental damage
during armed conflict and a growing determination to somehow limit the potential for destruction.
B. Hague Convention Number IV of 1907
The Hague Convention Number IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land is one
of thirteen conventions adopted at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907.105 The United
States, along with 36 other nations, became party to this treaty.106 At the time that the treaty was
adopted, Iraq was still part of the Ottoman Empire.w? Since Iraq was not a sovereign state, it was
unable to become a contracting party to the convention, and it has not chosen to do so since
achieving its independence.
According to the Vienna Convention, states are bound only by those treaties which they have
signed and ratified. 108 However, during the Nuremberg Trials following World War II the
I04Tbe principles of customary international law found in the "Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,"
23 May 1969, reprinted in American JQurnal Qf InternatiQnal Law 62 (October 1969): 875-898, [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] . Article 53 states that treaties preempt conflicting customary international law except when the
customary law embodies a peremptory norm of general international law. But even this rule is not infallible. "The
convention method, however, has many drawbacks when it is considered as a method for securing international
agreement on general rules and principles of intemational law . . . the failure of governments to reach agreement, for
political reasons, in a conference convened to codify rules of international Iaw, would seem to case doubt upon
certain rules of international law whose validity has been admitted for a very long time and which has hitherto
generally been assumed to be part of customary international law." United Nations Secretariat, "Documents on the
Development and Codification of International Law," Supplement to American JQurnal of InternatiQnal Law 41
(1947), 115 .
IOSU.S., "Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) with Annex of
Regulations," 18 October 1907,36 Statues at Large 2277. 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
l06MJ. Bowman and DJ. Harris, eds ., Multilateral Treaties: Index and Current Status (London:
Butterworths.1984): 419.
I07The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Iraq." Iraq achieved independence in 1932.
I08Vienna Convention, supra note 104, Articles 6-17, 24, 25, 34-37 .
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International Tribunal recognized the Regulations in the Annex to the Hague Convention IV to be
declaratory of the laws and customs of war, and therefore applicable to all nations, whether or not
they are party to the Hague Convention. 109 These customs bear further discussion at this point,
for they bound the Iraqis as well as the Coalition forces, and thus provide a standard by which the
legality of the actions that led to the Gulf spill may be judged.
1. The customary laws of war
"The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 110 This
broad concept is the cornerstone of all of the laws of war which differentiate between combatants
and innocent civilians, and require military commanders to exercise discretion in choosing targets,
weapons, and tactics. This concept, the idea that war does not suspend all rules of behavior, lies
behind the treaty which forbids the indiscriminate slaughter of civilian populations and other
actions which cause unnecessary suffering. 111 It is the foundation of the convention which
requires all belligerents to treat prisoners of war with a certain degree of humanity ,112 and to afford
treatment to sick or wounded soldiers.113
Even a cursory perusal of these conventions shows that they share certain assumptions about
the conduct of war. There are certain ideals and behavioral norms common to all of them. These
norms or customs form the customary laws of war. "The core principles of the nebulous body of
l09Intemational Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), "Judgment and Sentence," American Joumal of
International Law 41 (1947), 172, as quoted inJames P. Terry, "The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact
of Desert Storm," Naval War College Review 337 (Winter 1992): 62.
llOHague Convention IV, supra note 105, Art. 2.
1l1"Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ," 12 August 1949, 6
V.S .T. 3516, T.I.A.S. no. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 28.
112"Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," 12 August 1949, 6 V.S .T. 3316 , T.I.A.S .
no. 3364, 75 V.N.T.S. 135.
113"Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field," 12 August 1949,6 V .S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S . no. 3362, 75 V.N.T .S. 31.
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customary international law have been identified as military necessity, avoidance of unnecessary
suffering, and proportionality," said one military commentator.n- These principles can be traced
back through history to the idealized code of chivalry which was incorporated into European
military law of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.n> This common law among soldiers "had a
sound authoritarian basis in the written laws of Rome, the canon and civil laws. These laws had
general validity because the equation of Christian society and the Roman people was assumed as a
historical fact."116 This assumption of universal validity has been incorporated into documents
such as the Hague Convention and carried forward into the present day.U?
The importance of these three concepts to the environmental destruction caused during the Gulf
War merits their brief definition. Citing the Law of Land Warfare manual published by the
Department of the Army, Captain Wilson says that "the concept of military necessity provides that
a combatant is justified in applying any force necessary to secure the complete submission by the
enemy as soon as possible-vas long as the means are not prohibited by the provisions of the laws
of war."118 This leaves quite a bit of discretion to the field commander, by requiring only that he
avoid those actions which are specifically prohibited. The old saying that the necessity is the
mother of invention holds true on the battlefield; in the heat of action, desperate soldiers have come
114William A. Wilcox, "Environmental Protection in Combat," Southern lIIinois University Law Joumal 17
(Winter 1993): 299-315. Available in WESTLAW, JLR database.
115M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 239.
116Ibid, 241.
117Fora thorough treatment of the intellectual challenges of determining the status of norms of the
conventional law of armed conflict as customary law, see Theodore Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary
Law," American Joumal of International Law 81 (1987): 348-370. Meron concludes that "The decisive factor is
whether states observe the Geneva Conventions or not. As with other widely ratified treaties, if states parties
comply with the Geneva Conventions in actual practice, verbally affirm their vital normative value, and accept them
in opinio juris, states and tribunals will be reluctant to make and to accept the argument that the law of Geneva is
solely, or even primarily, conventional. Such observance by the parties will eventually lead to the perception of
governments and public opinion, to the blurring of the distinctions between norms of the Conventions that are
already recognized as customary law and other humanitarian provisions of the Conventions that have not yet achieved
that status." Ibid., 370 .
118Wilcox, "Environmental Protection in Combat," supra note 114, page number not available in JLR.
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up with tactics which, though successful, are later judged to have inflicted damage and suffering
beyond that needed to secure the submission of the enemy. The decision to bomb the cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear weapons was rationalized on the grounds that it would save
hundreds of thousands of lives, both American and Japanese, and avoid the pain, suffering and
destruction of a ground war by forcing the Japanese to capitulate prior to invading their
homeland. 119
The concept that lawful war should avoid causing needless pain and suffering is manifest in
Article 23(c) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which prohibit killing or wounding soldiers who
have already surrendered. It is also seen in the general prohibitions of the Hague Regulations on
indiscriminate attacks on civilians,120 which brings us to the last concept; that of proportionality.
With the development of increasingly sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, the concept of
proportionality has gained new and urgent significance. Customary law requires that loss of life
and damage to property should not be out of proportion to the tactical advantage gained by the
military action, though this principle is nowhere expressly stated.l21 In fact, one may extrapolate
from this to say that there is a new element that needs to be considered in the laws of war, and that
is survival. As one commentator noted, "The principle that due care must be exercised toward
third parties is generally accepted, even in the law of war. It must thus be concluded a fortiori that
119The specific factual premises of this reasoning are being increasingly challenged. Richard A. Falk, supra
note 5, at 34.
12o"lf unnecessary violence is prohibited, it follows logically that violence which causes disproportionate
suffering to soldiers or civilians compared with the military gains is also prohibited." Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, The Law of War and Dubious Weapons (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International,
1976), 8.
121/bid., 8 and 36. But the existence of this principle may be inferred from a study of the laws of war; for
example, Article 51 (5)(b) of Geneva Protocol I, supra note 7, and Annex I, Article 3 (3) of the "Protocol on the Use
of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices to the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to beExcessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,"
reprinted in International Le~alMaterials 19 (1980): 1523-1529. Th~se'protocols attem.p~ t~ pr~hi~it.indiscriminate
attacks or employment of weapons "which may be expected to cause incidental loss o~ civ..han h~e, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects. or a combination thereof. which would be excessive III relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated."
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acts which injure or threaten mankind are forbidden in every circumstance."122 Implicit in the
value placed on survival is the recognition that the environment in which man must live is matter of
vital concern to the international community.
2. The Hague Regulations
The Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention contain three provisions which can be
used as guidance in determining the protection afforded the environment by the laws of war. The
first, Article 22, says that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited." The guiding principle here is that the outbreak of hostilities does not suspend all rules
of behavior, and it is this ideal which underlies all attempts to set forth laws for war. 123
Article 23 follows to say that "to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war" is forbidden. We have here the
recognition that the capture and destruction of property is not a legitimate military objective in and
of itself, and by implication the word "property" may include the environment. The phrase
"necessities of war," however, is subject to interpretation and is often used to justify questionable
conduct in pursuit of military objectives. Recognizing this, Article 23 provides some additional
guidance for deciding what may be permissible under the aegis of military necessity by saying that
"arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering" are forbidden. Implicit in
the prohibition of acts that cause unnecessary suffering and destruction is a concern for
proportionality and discrimination in the use of force. "Unnecessary suffering" and "military
necessity," then, are the two ends of the pole used in the military officer's attempt to balance
\ \
122TheLaw of War and Dubious Weapons, supranote 120, at 38.
123Anearlier statement of this principle is found in the "Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight," commonly referred to as the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868,
which condemned the employment of arms which "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable." Reprinted in American Journal ofIntcrnational Law Supplement 1 (1907): 95.
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between expediency and legality.I 24 Any COUlt attempting to factually determine whether the
Persian Gulf spill was in violation of the laws of war would have to weigh these two imperatives.
Article 55 addresses the treatment of an occupied country, and allows the occupying state the
use of "public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the Hostile State,
and situated in the occupied country." This itemized description of the occupied territory embodies
the contemporary understanding of nature in 1907, before the term 'ecosystem' became part of the
popular lexicon, but it can be argued that the oil reserves of Kuwait, the wells, the pipelines and
the pumping stations are included in the national property protected by this article. The occupying
state is enjoined to "safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in accordance
with the rules of usufruct," an even more specific statement of its obligation to protect the natural
resources of the occupied nation. These restrictions could be considered analogous to the public
trust doctrine in American domestic law, which requires the government to administer public
property as caretakers for the public. 125 Whether or not Iraq complied with the rules of usufruct
will bear further discussion in Section V.
The convention imposes no criminal liability on states that violate the Regulations, but it does
provide in Article 53 that the state may be required to make restitution for certain categories of
damages. Though the provisions of Article 55 are very broad and there is no definitive list of
prohibited action, there is sufficient evidence to make a good case that the destruction of Kuwait's
oil wells was an action in violation of the rules of usufruct, as will be shown in Section V.
One commentator holds that under Article 3 a belligerent "is liable to pay compensation for the
destruction and seizure of property not justified by the imperative necessities of war, and is
124"Destruction is characterized as irrelevant when it is not directed toward the achievement of the legitimate
objective specified ... Proportionality is commonly taken to refer to the relation between the amount of destruction
effected and the military objective sought ... Disproportionate destruction is unnecessary destruction." Myres S.
McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulations of
International Coercion (1961), 524, as quotedin Feliciano, "Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources
as War Measures: A Note on Some International Law Problems in the Gulf War," Houston Journal of International
~ 14 (Spring 1992): 512.
125Wilcox, "Environmental Protection in Combat," supra note 114.
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responsible for all such acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces,"126 and that
such acts are war crimes punishable under the convention. The courses of action open to the
Coalition allies for dealing with the devastation as a war crime under the Hague Convention and
annexed Regulations will be discussed further in Section VI.
C. 1949 Geneva Convention Number IV
The second international convention which has some bearing on the subject of environmental
protection during armed conflict is the 1949 Geneva Convention Number IV Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar,127 to which Iraq is a party. 128 As in the Hague
Convention, the question of environmental protection is not specifically addressed. However, it is
implicitly provided for in Article 53 which states, "any destruction by the Occupying Power of real
or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to
other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."129 This restriction is very
similar to the limitations placed on the occupying state by the rules of usufruct.
Article 147 prohibits the "extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military
126MorrisGreenspan, The Modem Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959),
280.
127"Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War," supra note 111.
128Bowman and Harris , Multilateral Treaties' Index and Current Status. supranote 106, at 154.
I29In the aftermath of World War II, a number of German civilian administrators were charged with war crimes
for "wholesale cutting of Polish timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to preserve the timber
resources of the country." United Nations War Crimes Comm ission, Histocy of the United Nations War Crimes
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948),496,
quoted in Richard A. Falk, Revitalizin~ International Law (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 171. The
administrators were following German policy for the occupation, as set forth by Goering in a memorandum issued
on October 13, 1949, in which they were directed that "There must be removed from the territories of the
Government General (occupied Poland) all raw materials, scrap materials, etc., that are of use to the German war
economy." As quotedin Antony Polonsky, "The German Occupation of Poland During the First and Second World
Wars : A Comparison," in Armies of Occupation, ed. Roy A. Prete and A. Hamish Ion, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1984),137.
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necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. " Here we see again the use of the customary
law test of military necessity being applied to the contemplated action, a test that will be important
in determining whether the oil spill was an act of war or ecoterrorism.
This Convention, like the Hague Convention, attempts to outline the minimum standards of
conduct required by international law during war, but it goes a step further than the Hague
Convention in that Article 146 of the Geneva Convention acknowledges criminal liability for
individuals who violate the Convention and Article 148 imposes civil liability on the offending state
for acts which are categorized as grave (or material) breaches of the treaty.l30 States patty to the
Geneva Convention are required to investigate alleged grave breaches of the treaty and to either
subject the offenders to trial, or to relinquish jurisdiction to the aggrieved nation. The provisions
of this treaty, according to Article 2, are "in addition to the provisions which shall be implemented
in peacetime," a point which will be discussed further in the next section in conjunction with a
description of the peacetime treaties for the prevention of oil pollution.
D. 1977 Geneva Protocol 1
As warfare moved into the twentieth century, it became obvious that the Geneva Conventions,
which had been negotiated on the basis of experience gained during World War II, needed to be
updated.ut There are two additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention. Both concern the
protection of victims of hostilities, but it is the first that regulates international armed conflict and is
of concern to this study. Protocol I has been ratified or acceded to by 107 states as of 15
l30The Vienna Convention defines a material breach as "the violation of a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." See Vienna Convention, supra note 104, Article 60 (3)(b).
l3IThe nature of hostilities has changed since World War II; many conflicts cannot be neatly defined as
"international in character," and this, combined with the increase in guerrilla warfare, gave rise to questions
concerning the traditional definition of combatants. These concerns were two key factors that provided the impetus
for the 1977 Geneva Protocols . Sharp, "The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed
Conflict," supra note 102, at 13.
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November 1991, but Iraq is not a contracting party, and neither is the United States.132
Article 35 (3) of Geneva Protocol I prohibits states from "employing methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment."133 While the intent is good, the language is seriously flawed;
this is what is seen by some scholars as a "should have known" standard for military commanders
whose actions in the field may later be judged to have caused damage above the permissible
threshold. The Legal Advisor for the U.S. State Department voiced concern that under such a
wide-reaching prohibition, military commanders might be subject to war crimes charges for
incidental environmental damage resulting from military operations,134 for neither this nor Article
55135 provides any definitive standards of conduct for a military commander in the middle of a hot
war. The delegates themselves were not in agreement on what the terms "widespread, long-term
and severe" meant; some delegations believed that ten years was the appropriate time span for
"long-term" damage, while others thought that twenty or more was appropriate.us
132TheUnited States signed both Protocols in Geneva when they were opened for signature on December 12,
1977, but has yet to ratify either of them. Feliciano, "Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War
Measures," supra note 124, at 499 .
133This is the "first international agreement which attempted to directly put the issue of environmental defense
in time of war in a more detailed and proper perspective," according to Margaret Okordudu-Fubara, "Oil in the
Persian War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare," St. Mary's Law Journal 23 (1991) : 123-219.
Available in WESTLAW, JLR database.
134Remarks of Judge Abraham D. Sofaer at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of
Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law, quoted in Mark J.T. Caggiano, "The Legitimacy of
Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare: Customary Substance over Conventional Form," Boston Collel:e
Environmental Affairs Law Review 20 (1992): 491. See also Martin Dupuis et al.; "The Sixth Annual American
Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions," American IJnjyersity
Journal ofImernational Policy and Law 2 (1987): 415-434.
135Article 55 provides that "(1) Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population; and (2) Attacks against the natural environment by way of
reprisals are forbidden."
136Feliciano, "Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War Measures," supra note 124, at
503-504. Though these criteria seem to be obviously targeted at high-yield theater nuclear weapons, the United
States specified in its understanding that these rules would not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, which
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Though the Geneva Protocol I is seriously weakened by the fact that it does not provide
working definitions of "widespread," "long-term" or "severe," it is still an important stride in the
direction of requiring protection of the environment during hostilities. Articles 85 through 87
provide that grave breaches of this convention are to be recognized as war crimes, and criminal
liability may be imposed on military commanders for failing to prevent such actions on the part of
their subordinates. The offending state may also bear civil liability for such actions, and may be
required by Article 91 to pay compensation.
The Geneva Protocol I, according to one interpretation, "is meant to ban the employment in
armed conflict of methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
serious damage to the environment, whatever the weapons used; to make this ban applicable, the
presence of all three of the criteria--widespread, long term and severe-Is required."137
At the request of the V .N. Secretary General, Canada hosted a conference of international
experts in July of 1991 to consider Iraq's acts of destruction and their legal implications. Some
commentators had advanced the view that the environmental provisions of Geneva Protocol I had
passed into customary law because the Protocol had been so broadly accepted. 138 The forum,
however. concluded that since neither the V.S. nor Iraq are parties to this Protocol, 139 it could not
the U.S. regarded as subject to other agreements and thus already sufficiently regulated. Ibid., 505.
137JozefGoldblat, "The Envirorunental Modification Convention of 1977: An Analysis." In Enyironmental
Warfare: A Technical LeCal and policy Appraisal, supra note 5, at 55.
138"1 think it can safely be concluded thai the principle expressed in all these instruments--that nature is no
longer fair game in mankind' s conflicts--is well on its way to becoming an accepted principle of international law."
Remarks on Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention by Paul Sasz at a panel discussion: "The Gulf War:
Environment as a Weapon," in the 1991 proceedings of the 85th Annual Meeting of the AmeriCan Society of
International Law. April 17-20. 1991, available in WESTLAW, JLR database.
139Fora discussion on reasons why the U.S. refused to ratify Additional Protocol I after signing both
Protocols on December 12, 1977, the day they were opened for signature, see George H. Aldrich, "Prospects for
United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions," American Journal of
International Law 85 (1991): 1-20. Aldrich, who was head of the United States delegation to the conference that
adopted the 1977 Geneva Protocols, believes that President Reagan refused to ratify Protocol I under the mistaken
belief that it would benefit terrorists and harm civilians, and that Reagan's decision was based largely the political
motivation of a desire to portray his administration as being tough on terrorism. Aldrich also believes that much of
Protocol I is simply a codification of customary law, and that the environmental protection provisions of Articles 35
and 55 will probably be "quickly accepted as part of customary international law insofar as non-nuclear warfare is
concerned." Ibid., at 14.
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be applied as law to any case that might be brought as a result of the oil fires and the Persian Gulf
spill. The forum went on to say that:
Even had Protocol I been in force, there were questions as to whether the Iraqi actions
would have violated its environmental provisions. DUling that treaty's negotiation, there was
general agreement that one of its criteria for determining whether a violation had taken place ("long
term") was measured in decades. It is not clear the damage Iraq caused, while severe in a layman's
sense of the term , would meet the technical-legal use of that term in Protocol I. The prohibitions
on damage to the environment contained in Protocol I were not intended to prohibit battlefield
damage caused in conventional operations and, in all likelihood, would not apply to Iraq's actions
in the Persian Gulf war. 140
A further barrier to applying Protocol I to the Gulf oil spill is that Article 57, which requires
military planners to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage
to civilian objects, only applies to civilian targets. One can imagine Saddam Hussein's defense
attorney using the same argument made by Anthony Leibler:
This means that once a target is classified as yielding military gain, any means of warfare may
be employed against it without regard to proportionality ... if an amphibious attack upon land
is likely, the coastal waters become a legitimate military target for the purposes of self-defense.
Under Article 57, since the waters are a military target, no rules of proportionality applies and
the Article would not be violated even if billions of barrels of oil are pumped into the sea
causing long-term severe damage to the regional ecology, economy, water supply and possibly
human inhabitantslt-u
E. Environmental Modification Convention
As modern technology raised the specter of "nuclear winter" and wide-spread suffering and
death caused by new chemical and biological weapons, the need for a system of checks and
balances on this destructive capability became evident. Accidents such as those at Love Canal and
Three Mile Island enabled people to imagine how indiscriminately destructive modem warfare
could be, a fear that dove-tailed with the growing environmentalism of the late 60s and early 70s.
1400epartment of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War A Fjnal Report to Con\:ress ([Washington,
D.C.]: U.S . Department of Defense, 1992),0-27.
141Leibler,"Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage," supra note 102, at 22-23.
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During the Vietnam War, the United States employed herbicides and defoliants to deprive enemy
forces of cover and food and tried experimental cloud seeding techniques in an effort to alter the
weather. 142 Though these tactics were only marginally successful, the public revulsion at the
willingness of the government to employ such destructive techniques eventually led to bilateral
talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and multilateral negotiations held at the
Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. 143 From these efforts came the only
international convention to date that specifically addresses environmental modification by military
means and for military purposes. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was signed on May 18, 1977 and entered
into force on the 5th of October of the following year. 144
The Environmental Modification or ENMOD Convention prohibits the hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having "wide-spread, long-lasting or severe effects,"
wording almost identical to that of Protocol I. Though the limiting threshold appears similar, there
are some unexpected difficulties that must be overcome to determine the substantive reach of the
provisions of the conventions.
The ENMOD Convention prohibits the environmental modification, which it describes as the
"deliberate manipulation of natural processes" in order to change "the dynamics, composition or
structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer
space,"145 for the purpose of inflicting damage on the civilian population or armed forces of a
142Caggiano, "The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare," supra note 134, at 488.
143Fora fuller discussion on the negotiation and adoption of the Environmental Modification Convention, see
Lawrence Juda "Negotiating a Treaty on Environmental Modification Warfare: The Convention on Environmental
Warfare and its Impact upon AnTIs Control Negotiations," International Or~anization 32 (Autumn 1978): 975-991.
144TheENMOD Convention has been ratified by 71 states as of December 31, 1990. Iraq signed this
convention but has not ratified it. The United States ratified the ENMOD Convention on January 17, 1990, subject
to the Understanding defining the terms "long-lasting," "severe," and "widespread." United Nations , Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 December 1990 (1991), 827, as quoted in Feliciano,
"Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War Measures," supra note 124, at 500.
145ENMOD Convention, supra note 6, Article II.
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nation party to the Convention. Examples given in the Convention of such manipulation include
the creation of tidal waves or earthquakes, and artificial changes in weather or climate patterns. It
does not prohibit damage to the environment which may be incidental to hostilities; it only forbids
the use of the environment as a weapon.l 46 Non-military or non-hostile uses of environmental
modification are not regulated by the ENMOD Convention, even when they produce destructive
results above the permissible threshold. As one commentator ironically noted, "What is militarily
attractive remains permissible, or at least not explicitly prohibited, whereas that which is of no
evident relevance to war-making is diligently proscribed." Protocol I, on the other hand, seeks to
specifically forbid uses of weapons and tactics which inflict collateral damage upon the natural
environment.
Another difference between the two conventions is that under Geneva Protocol I, the damage
must meet all three criteria at the same time: the damage must be wide spread, long term, and
severe. The ENMOD Convention is usually interpreted to apply if anyone of the three threshold
criteria are met.i-? Furthermore, the ENMOD Convention has an attached Understanding relating
to Article I which attempts to define these threshold criteria, "Widespread" is defined as
encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers. "Long-lasting" is a
period several months in duration, up to a season. "Severe" means the change involves serious or
significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
The ENMOD Convention, then, requires a lower threshold of environmental damage than does
Protocol I, but is focused on preventing the use of speculative new technologies whose primary
purpose is to alter natural processes so as to militarily disadvantage the enemy rather than on the
incidental damage that could be caused by existing weaponry.I48 The Understanding tacitly
146Katberine M. Kelly, "Declaring War on the Environment: The Failure of International Environmental
Treaties During the Persian Gulf War," American University Journal of International Law and Policy 7 (1992): 934.
147Feliciano, "Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War Measures," supra note 124, at
503.
148Ju<la, "Negotiating a Treaty on Environmental Modification Warfare," supra note 143, at 976-977.
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acknowledges the superficial similarity between the two conventions in that it states that "the
interpretation set forth above is intended exclusively for this convention and is not intended to
prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used in connection with any other
international agreement."149
Bowing to political realities, the negotiators of the Environmental Modification Convention did
not attempt to do away with the customary law principle of "military necessity," but only to set
some upper limits on the side-effects of acts of war. They focused on preventing "changes in the
environment brought about by deliberate human manipulation of natural processes, as distinct from
conventional acts of warfare which might result in adverse effects on the environment."150 So
what we have in this Convention is an international agreement forbidding the actual use of forces
of nature as a weapon during hostilities, whether or not war has been declared. The focus here is
on the effect the supposed weapon has on the environment, and not on the precise environmental
modification technique used. There is no categorical listing of prohibited actions, only of
prohibited effects. As one commentator ironically summarized the ENMOD Convention, "What is
militarily attractive remains permissible, or at least not explicitly prohibited, whereas that which is
of no evident relevance to war making is diligently proscribed." 151
Though Iraq participated in the negotiations leading to the drafting of the text, and indeed
signed the text, it did not either ratify the treaty or make a subsequent declaration to the effect that it
did not intend to be a party. It could perhaps be argued that, having signed the treaty and never
publicly retracted that action, Iraq is subject to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties "to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the 1977
Environmental Convention. However, no COUlt or arbitrator has yet held the Convention to be part
of customary international law.
149Westing, Environmental Warfare, supra note 5, at 97.
15OGoldblat, "The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977," supra note 137, at 53.
151Falk, "Environmental Disruption by Military Means and International Law," supra note 119, at 33.
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Even had Iraq been party to the ENMOD Convention, the pollution of the Persian Gulf did not
create earthquakes or tidal waves, or make permanent changes to the weather patterns of the
region. Even had there been a widespread, long-lasting and severe change to the weather, it is
debatable whether the pollution incident was used to gain any military advantage. The question of
motive would also have to be answered; if the damage was unforeseen or unanticipated, an act of
haste and panic and not a deliberate attempt to use the environment itself ali a weapon, then it could
be ruled that the act did not violate the ENMOD Convention.
There are a number of other treaties which limit the ability of states to destroy the environment
by forbidding or severely circumscribing the use of certain weapons; first use of chemical and
biological weapons is forbidden by the Poisonous Weapons Protocol of 1925 and the use of land
mines and incendiary weapons is covered in the Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1981. These
conventions are as ineffective as any other law which is unenforced; a cursory study of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of the Kurdish people provides
numerous examples of breaches of these conventions. Furthermore, in the words of one writer,
"these rules do not significantly prevent deliberate environmental damage--they merely reduce the
variety of tools which may be employed for that purpose."152 Since they have no direct bearing on
the oil spill in the Persian Gulf, they will not be considered further in this paper.
152Leibler, "Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage," supra note 102, at 21.
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IV. Peacetime Regimes
A. International Conventions in Force to Prevent Pollution
As mentioned before, Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Number IV states that the
treaty is to be enforced in addition to peacetime provisions.l 53 Marine pollution was one of the
first issues that forced governments to grapple with the fact that sovereign nations are
environmentally interconnected. The first major multinational international pollution treaty was
signed in 1954, and has been followed by many other conventions that address maritime pollution :
the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,154 the Convention on the High
Seas,155 the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matters,156 and the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,157 just to name some
of the most important treaties.
lS3Vienna Convention, supra note 104, at Article II.
lS4"Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil," 12 May 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327
U.N.T.S. 3. This document was amended in 1962, 1969, and 1971. Although Iraq was not a contracting party to
this convention, the "Action Plan for the Development of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Areas of Bahrain,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates" appealed to Iraq and other parties to
the Action Plan to ratify and implement the convention. "Action Plan for Development of the Marine Environment
and the Coastal Areas," reprinted in International Legal Materials 17 (May 1978): 509. As of 1993, Iraq still had
not signed the treaty. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaties in Force ([Washington, D.C.]:
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser , 1993),356-357.
lSS"Convention on the High Seas," 29 April 195829,13 V.S.T. 2312, 450 V.N.T.S. 82. As of 1993, Iraq
was not a party to the convention. Treaties in Force, supra note 154, at 360.
156"Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters," 29
December 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120. As of 1993, Iraq was not a party. Treaties in Force, supra
note 154, at 358.
lS7'1Jnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," 29 April 1958, 13 V.S.T. 2312, 450 V.N.T.S. 82.
As of 1993, Iraq had not ratified the 1958 Convention, which entered into force in 1962. Treaties in Force, supra
note 154, at 360.
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Though the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention158 had not entered into force at the time of the
Gulf War, Iraq had already deposited its instrument of ratification with the U.N. Office for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea. 159 From this it may be argued that, in accordance with Article 18
of the Vienna Convention, Iraq is obliged "to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose" of the treaty. Though the technical status of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was
still the subject of debate during the Gulf war, I60 some of the principles set forth in the Convention
are reflections of accepted principles of intemational environmental law.
All of Part XII of the Law of the Sea Convention deals with the "Protection and Preservation of
the Marine Environment." Article 192 reiterates the obligation that all Sates have "to protect and
preserve the marine environment," and Article 194 requires states to take the necessary steps to
"prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source." Italso
requires that states ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause pollution
damage to other states, and to use the best practicable means at their disposal to prevent pollution
from spreading beyond their territory into that of other states.161 Article 207 requires states to
158"United Nation s Convention on Law of the Sea," U.N. Doc. NCONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in
International Legal Materials 21 (1982): 1261 [hereinafter 1982 Law of the Sea Convention].
159"Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to which tbe United States is Not a Party," International Legal
Materials 28 (May 1989): 792. Iraq deposited its instrument of ratification on July 30th, 1985.
l60The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention expanded on a number of concepiS previously found in other
agreements, and included some principles from the 1958 Convention without change. However, the new provisions
dealing with seabed mining caused a number of industrialized countries that are traditional maritime nations, notably
the United States, to draw back from signing the convention. The position of the United States is that with the
exception of Article 11, which deals with seabed mining, the provisions of the convention arc declaratory of
customary law. See generally Moria L. McConnell and Edgar Gold, "The Modern Law of the Sea: Framework for
the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment," Case Western Reserye Journal of International Law 23
(1991): 83-105 for a discussion of the convention and its probable effect on international environmental law.
161Pollution is defined by Article 1(4) of the Convention as "the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances into the marine environment . .. likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to the living
resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities , including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the ocean, impairment of the quality of use of sea water and reduction of amenities." The massive
oil spill caused by the Iraqis certainly fits these criteria.
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minimize marine pollution from land-based sources,162 and Article 210forbids unregulated
dumping. 163
Article 235 is a comprehensive statement of liability. This article holds that
(1) States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with
international law.
(2) States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems for
prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the
marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.
In peacetime, then, there exists an international obligation to prevent damage to the marine
environment, and to make restitution for any such damage. The basic responsibility to refrain from
activities which may result in transboundary pollution has become an accepted principle of
international law, and the important question whether or not this duty is suspended during
hostilities will be considered later in this section.
Some of these treaties are binding on the states party to them, but not on other states. Some are
considered as having incorporated aspects of customary law, while still others are credited with
having helped to create customary law. Although these conventions do not govern the conduct of
hostilities directly, they reinforce the legal foundation for civil liability for environmental damage
established under the laws of war. Perhaps more importantly, when considering criminal
responsibility, the peacetime regime also creates a context of international environmental law within
which the principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality can be
evaluated.
162"States shall take ot.her measures as may be necessary . .. to minimize, to t.he fullest extent possible, t.he
release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, into the marine environment,"
1982Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 158, at Article 207.
163"State ... laws, regulations and measures shall ensure that dumping is not carried out without the
permission of the competent aut.horities of [coastal and affected] States," 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, supra
note 158, at Article 210. Articles 211 and 212 impose a general duty to adopt laws and regulations for the
prevention and control of pollution from vessels and from the air.
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B. Regional Conventions on Pollution Prevention
Though Iraq is not party to any of the general international conventions in force that are cited
above, it is party to several regional conventions on marine pollution. In 1978 Iraq signed the
Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine environment from
Pollution. l 64 Article VI of this Convention provides in general terms that "contracting States shall
take all appropriate measures to prevent ... pollution caused by discharges from land reaching the
Sea Area whether water-borne, air-borne, or direction from the coast including outfalls and
pipelines."165 The thorny subject of liability, however, is only touched on lightly in Article XIII,
which provides that "contracting States undertake to co-operate in the formulation and adoption of
appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of civil liability and compensation for
damage resulting for pollution of the marine environment, bearing in mind applicable international
rules 'and procedures ... "166
In the same month, the parties to the Kuwait Convention signed the Protocol Concerning
Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of
Emergency.ie? This Protocol provides that "the Contracting States shall co-operate in taking the
necessary and effective measures to protect the coastline and related interests of one or more of the
States from the threat and effects of pollution due to the presence of oil ... in the marine
environment resulting from marine emergencies."168 In Article II the Protocol defines a "marine
164Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment, "Kuwait Regional Convention for
Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution," reprinted in International Legal
Materials 17 (May 1978): 511-526.
165/bid., 514.
166/bid .,516-517.
167Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment, "Protocol concerning Regional Co-
operation in combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency," reprinted in
International Le~alMaterials 17 (May 1978): 526-540.
168Ibid., 528.
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emergency" as any "incident, occurrence or situation, however causes, resulting in substantial
pollution or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine environment by oil or other
harmful substances."!69 Article X requires that any Contracting States faced with a marine
emergency has the responsibility to take appropriate action to combat the pollution, immediately
inform all other Contracting States ... of any action which it has taken or intends to take to combat
the pollution."!70
So, even though Iraq was not patty to any of the major international conventions regarding oil
pollution, Iraq still had a clear obligation to other Arab States in the region not to pollute the waters
of the Persian Gulf, as well as a contingent obligation to notify other Gulf States in event of a
pollution incident, and to assist in the clean-up. Is this obligation still binding during war?!7!
C. Status ofPeacetime Pollution Prevention Treaties During War
Article 73 of the Vienna Convention states that "this present convention shall not prejudge any
question that may arise in regard to this treaty ... from an outbreak of hostilities between States."
In other words, hostile relations do not automatically terminate treaties between the conflicting
parties. In fact, some treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions, were created specifically to
govern the conduct of hostilities, while others, such as the Charter of the United Nations, were
intended to continue in effect regardless of the status of diplomatic relations between member
169/bid., 527.
17o/bid., 532.
!7!"Most writers agree that there are six basic ways in which a treaty may be terminated: (1) inaccordance
with the terms of the treaty itself; (2) byexplicit or tacit agreement of the parties concerned; (3) through violation of
the provision of the agreement byone party, the second party then asserting, if it sodesires, that it considers the
treaty abrogated bythe violation; (4) by one party on the grounds that fundamental conditions onwhich the treaty
rests have changed; (5) through the emergence ofa new peremptory norm ofgeneral international law conflicting
with the treaty; and (6) through the outbreak ofhostilities between parties to the agreement," Von Glahn,.I..aYl
Amon~ Nations, supranote 10, at 585. It is this last cause for termination that merits discussion in the case of the
Gulf oilspill caused by the Iraqis.
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nations. We have to look at each treaty in the light of the circumstances to determine whether or
not it is still applicable during armed conflict between the two States. Multilateral treaties present
an even more complicated situation because two of the member states may be at war, while the rest
are not; is the treaty in abeyance between all of the contracting states, or just the two that are at war,
or is it still in force regardless of the armed conflict?l72
Article 56 of the Vienna Convention provides some guidance for determining whether a treaty
is in force in a given situation: "A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination . . .
is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless ... a right of denunciation or withdrawal may
be implied by the nature of the treaty." So a treaty whose nature is incompatible with a state of
hostilities, such as a treaty providing for technology transfer or mutual defense, would be void
once the shooting starts. A treaty whose nature is not incompatible with a state of hostilities, such
as a limitation on the taking of whales for commercial purposes or on the protection of the
environment. may continue in force even between States that are at war.
In practice, however, "many types or treaty are regarded as at least suspended in time of war,
and war conditions may lead to termination of treaties on grounds of impossibility or fundamental
change of circumstances."173 Article 62 of the Vienna Convention provides that changed
circumstances, also known as rebus sic stantibus, may be invoked as grounds for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty, but only when "(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the patties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the
change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty."
172Artic1es 19-23 of the Vienna Convention describe the process by which reservations may be attached to a
treaty. Reservations are "changes or amendments inserted into a treaty by one party as an implied or specified
condition of ratification," von Glahn, Law Among Nations, supra note 10, at 569. This presents little difficulty in
interpreting bilateral treaties, but when considering multilateral treaties, "in the Americas, the view is held that a
treaty is in force on a strictly national basis: those countries that accept another state's reservation are bound by it,
whereas others may declare not to do so and are not bound by it as altered but only in its original form." Ibid., 570.
The view generally shared by European states is that a state may make reservations only with the consent of all
states which have already ratified the treaty. Ibid. So the problem of deciphering which multilateral treaties apply in
which circumstances to which nations can become extremely complicated.
173Ian Brownlie, Principles of PubUc International Law, 4th ed . (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990),617.
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Though the Secretary-General of the United Nations has acknowledged the validity of the
doctrine rebus sic stantibus, and courts have invoked the principle in deciding cases, 174 it is hard
to imagine a circumstances when unilateral denunciation of a treaty on these grounds will be
agreeable to both partics.r'> Looking back to the nature of the treaty, the analyst must try to
determine whether the circumstances that changed formed an essential basis of the consent of the
parties in the treaty. In the case of a treaty involving technology transfer, the a priori assumption is
that friendly relations exist between the states involved. The same holds true with treaties
involving arms sales, mutual defense, and so on. If there is a fundamental change in that pre-
existing condition that formed the basis on which the treaty was negotiated, then there may be
grounds for invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.Vlv
It can be argued that protecting the common environment is a valid goal, whether or not the
states party to the convention are engaged in hostilities; after all, when the war is over, the
survivors have to find drinking water. Accepted obligations toward the environment and toward
future generations are not altered by a 42-day war. Most commentators take views similar to that
of Anthony Leibler, who states, "The legal regime did not, until very recently, even contemplate
deliberate of vindictive environmental pollution such as the pumping of oil into the sea of the
ignition of oil-well fires which OCCUlTed in the Persian Gulf Conflict. Nevertheless. to the extent
that these laws (international environmental law) apply to negligent or careless pollution, it is
174TheInternational Court of Justice affirmed the doctrine in the case of United Kingdom v Iceland in 1973
when it held that "this principle and the conditions and exceptions to which it is subjected, have been embodied in
Art. (sic) 62 of the Vienna Convention . .. which may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing
customary international law," as quoted in Law Among Nations, supra note 10, at 588.
175/bid.,588-589. There are few actual examples of this doctrine in practice: von Glahn cites the end of a
number of concordats between the Vatican and several states in 1861, and the lapse of cultural agreements between
Germany and a number of European states, concluded in the 1930s.
176However, the same article explicitly forbids invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus if the treaty
established a boundary, or if the change was the "result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation
under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty."
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logical to assume that they must certainly apply to deliberate pollution."I77 The difficulty lies in
enforcing these conventions once diplomatic relations have broken down. A Congressional
Research Service report noted that "it remains highlyquestionable whether current environmental
law sets enforceable liability standards, or was intended to set enforceable liability standards, with
respect to actions under taken during military hostilities."178
D. Development ofCustomary Law Regarding Environmental Protection
As the web of treaty law, or hard law, protecting the environment steadily expands, the threads
of certain common principles find their way over time into customary international law, or soft
law, as happened with the Hague Convention Number IV. Conversely, the norms of international
behavior may change gradually, and only later be incorporated into a treaty. "Soft law solutions
change the political thinking on an issue," notes one analyst. "They alter the circumstances in
which an issue is considered; they cause opinion to coalesce. These changes can be a very
important catalyst in securing an agreement with a hard edge later. 179 Soft law solutions can thus
be useful steps on a longer journey. Soft law is where international law and international politics
combine to build new norms."I80 Soft law may make its first appearance in case law, law which
is created by the decisions of international tribunals or arbitral tribunals.
177 Parenthesis added. Leibler, "Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage," supra note 102, at 70.
l78c.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of l1Je Gulf War, supra note 2, at 4.
179Charney makes the interesting and rather cynical observation that "states will rarely, if ever, admit that they
have violated customary international law, even in order to change it. Rather, they will argue that their behavior is
consistent with the traditional law, or that the law has already changed." Jonathan I. Charney, "The Power of the
Executive Branch of the United States Government to Violate Customary International Law," American Joumal of
International Law 80 (1986): 916 .
180GeoffreyPalmer, "New Ways to Make International Environmental Law," American Journal of
International Law 86 (1992): 269 .
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1. Case Law
The first articulation of the customary law principle of good neighborliness and the harmless
use of territory was set forth in the decision of the tribunal of arbitration in the Trail Smelter case in
1941. 181 The United States complained that fumes from a Canadian smelting plant were causing
damage to people and property across the international border. The tribunal ruled that "under the
principles of international law ... no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence." 182 According to this decision, then, a nation can be held accountable for its
internal policies and actions if those actions impose negative externalities on a neighboring state.
The same principle of harmless use of territory is seen again in the C01jU Channel case of
1949, in which the International Court of Justice ruled that there is an "obligation, resting on every
state, not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the lights of other
states." 183
Though the arbitration panel and the International Court of Justice are not legislative bodies,
they perform an important legislative function in the creation of "case law." Upon review of the
particulars of the situation brought before them by the plaintiff, the court must determine the
substantive points of law in question and provide a decision in which relevant legal principles are
interpreted and applied. These decisions provide evidence of the existence of customary law
18lFor a complete copy of the report of the tribunal to the government of the United States and Canada, see
"Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal," American Journal of International Law 36 (1941): 684-736.
182/bid., 716.
183Law Amon~ Nations, supranote 10, at 461. Britain claimed compensation for two destroyers which struck
mines while transiting the Stair of Corfu, and asserted that the minefield must have been laid by or with the
connivance and knowledge of the Albanian government. The court found sufficient evidence to conclude that Albania
must have known about the mine-laying operation and ruled that Albania was responsible for the damage and loss of
human life, and that they should pay compensation not because of the provisions of any convention, but "because of
the principle of the freedom of maritime communication, and because of the obligation, resting on every state, not to
knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states." Ibid.
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regarding how a state may use its territory, and its subsequent legal and financial responsibility for
damages resulting from its misuse.
2. The Stockholm Declaration
The Stockholm Declaration was adopted in 1972 by 103 affirmative votes.l 84 There were 12
abstentions, but not a single negative vote. Both Iraq and the United States signed the Stockholm
Declaration, as did all the other countries of the Coalition. 185 The Stockholm Declaration is
another important step toward the recognition of a responsibility to protect the environment as a
feature of international customary law, but it was not as forceful as it might have been, for the
declaration avoided associating serious environmental damage with military activities other than the
use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 186
The General Assembly is not a law-making body.l87 However,"if a given resolution,
approved by an overwhelming majority of the members of the General Assembly, is then accepted
in practice by those members as representing a binding international legal obligation, a new rule of
customary international law must be accepted as having come into being."188 The exception would
184United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, "Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment," 16 June 1972, U.N. Assembly Doc. A/Conf. 48/14/Rev.l (1972);
Reprinted in International Environmental Law: Primary Materials (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers,
1990): 79-84 [hereinafter the Stockholm Declaration].
185''11Iere was remarkably little concern about environmentaldestruction per se until the Second Indochina
War (the Vietnam War). Efforts to place the issue of military activities on the agenda of the United Nations
conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, were not successful largely because of U.S.
objections arising from its sensitivity to criticism directed at its then current practices of environmental destruction
during the Second Indochina War." Richard A. Falk, Revilalizing International Law, supra note 119, at 172.
186"Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass
destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination
and complete destruction of such weapons." Stockholm Declaration, supra note 184, at 79.
187"The General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation," Charter of
the United Nations, reprinted in Encyclopediaof the United Na/ions and International A2reements,2nd ed., (London:
Taylor and Francis, Ltd., 1990), Article 14.
188von Glahn, Law Among Nations, supra note 10, at 16.
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be when a state declares its opposition to the principle being adopted by the rest of the nations, but
when the Stockholm Declaration was voted on, no state chose to exercise that option.
Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration states that "States shall take all possible steps to
prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to
harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses
of the sea." Deliberately dumping millions of gallons of oil into the coastal waters of Kuwait is
clearly an act in violation of that principle, for it wrecked havoc on the marine life, endangered the
desalination plants upon which Saudi Arabia depended for its water supply, and interfered with
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea.
Another provision of the Stockholm Declaration relevant to the oil pollution in the Gulf is
Principle 21, which attempts to reconcile sovereign rights with environmental protection. "States
have ... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." This principle would seem to extend the rule of responsibility for environmental
damages set forth in the Trail Smelter ca~ to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, such
as the high seas. 189
Though the Stockholm Declaration is not a legally binding treaty, the Declaration does serve to
reaffirm existing judicial precedent and to substitute the broader term "environment" for the more
restrictive and traditional term "territory" used in the Corfu Channel decision. One commentator
189In a detailed commentary on the Stockholm Declaration, Louis Sohn, Professor of International Law at
Harvard and participant in the conference as an observer for the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,
noted that "If states are bound by international law to prevent activities which damage the environment in other
states or in areas beyond national jurisdiction, states should also be responsible for damage actually caused by illegal
activities." Louis B. Sohn, "The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Haryard International Law
.Im1ma1. 14 (1973): 493. Considering Principle 22, in which states pledge to "develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damages caused by
activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction," Professor Sobn believed
that "it makes clear that liability is not limited to pollution but also extends to other environmental damage, for
instance, that caused by "environmental aggression,' such as weather and climate modification, changing the flow of
ocean currents, melting the polar icecaps, etc." Ibid; 495.
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notes that "This is ... one of the first attempts to secure recognition of the hitherto vague concept
of environment as a concept having legal force, a development which might eventually affect even
the context of States' obligations,"I90 in that "environment" is a broader and more general term
than "territory," and carries with it commensurately broader responsibilities.
3. The World Charter for Nature
In another significant step toward the creation of new international norms, the 1982 World
Charter for Nature was adopted by the UN General Assembly by a vote of 118 in favor and one
against. 191 Where the Stockholm Declaration merely laid out general guiding principles for the
preservation of the environment, the World Charter's provisions "directly address the damaging
effects warfare has upon the environment and specifically sought to limit environmental destruction
during the course of warfare," noted one scholar.l92 This goal is clearly seen in the text of the
document. "Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile
activities," Article 5 of the General Principles proclaims. "Military activities damaging to nature
shall be avoided," the Charter continues in Article 20. Following only a few years behind the
Geneva Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention, the World Charter for Nature is yet another step
in a developing international consensus on the sanctity of the environment. It is interesting to note
that the one negative vote cast against the World Charter for Nature was by the United States. 193
19OOrganizationfor Economic Co-operation and Development, Transboundary POllution (New York:
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1977),356.
191United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/7 "World Charter for Nature." Reprinted in International
Enyironmental Law: Primary Source Materials (Boston : Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990), 8-12.
192Caggiano, "The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare," supranote 134, at 502.
193TheUnited States had experimented with large-scale, systematic environmental warfare during the Vietnam
War. See Richard Fall<, Reyitalizing International Law, supra note 129, at 173-174. The U.S. expressed difficulties
with certain passages of the Charter that 1) suggested that the United Nations could in some way work to prevent
natural disasters (paragraph 13: "Measures intended to prevent, control or limit natural disasters, infestations and
diseases shall be specifically directed to the causes of these scourges and shall avoid adverse side-effects on nature.")
and 2) sought to create individual obligations under the Charter (paragraph 24: "Each person has a duty to act in
accordance with the provisions of the present Charter; acting individually, in association with others or through
participation in the political process, each person shall strive to ensure that the objectives and requirements of the
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Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Coalition allies all signed the charter without
reservation.
4. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Just over a year after the cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf War was signed, an
unprecedented meeting on environmental issues was held in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992. This
"Earth Summit," as it was popularly known, was the product of over two years of negotiations and
four preparatory conventions. The summit itself was attended by some 120 heads of states and
more than 20,000 people from non-governmental organizations and various professional groups,
and from this gathering came three documents, all of them negotiated on the basis of consensus
and legally non-binding.tv- The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development laid out 27
guiding principles fundamental to sustainable development. Forest management, recognized to be
a key issue for developing nations, was addressed briefly in the "Authoritative Non-binding
Statement on the Sustainable Management of the World's Forests." But the major product of the
conference was Agenda 21, a detailed road map for sustainable development addressing a wide
range of environmental and development issues such as technology transfer, conservation and
management of resources, affirmation of the role of indigenous peoples, non-governmental
organizations, and other groups. Agenda 21 calls for coastal nations to increase their efforts to
deal with land-based pollution sources, which accounts for up to 80 percent of marine
pollution. 195 In addition to the documents actually negotiated during the conference, two binding
present Charter are met.") Yearbook for the United Nations 36 (1982), 1024-1026.
194A date chosen to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, the meeting that produced the Stockholm Declaration. Congressional Research Service, International
Enyironment: Briefing Book on Major Selected Issues (Washington: Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1993), 72
[hereinafter C.R.S., International Enyironment Briefing Book on Major Selected Issuesl.
195Fora more detailed discussion of the Earth Summit and its outcome, see generally Robert W. Knecht and
Biliana Cicin-Sain, "Earth Summit Held: Stage Set for New Global Partnership," Ocean and COastal Management
19 (1993): 75-96.
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treaties were opened for signature that June: the Convention on Biological Diversity, 196 and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 197
Taken together with the growing number of conventions prohibiting marine pollution, these
three statements of principle and the preceding cases are indicative of an emerging peremptory
norm placing a high value on the marine environment. 198 "The fundamental nature of those
general principles creates a strong presumption of continuing applicability even in inter-belligerent
relations in time of aimed conflict. This presumption may be overturned only upon a clear
showing of a countervailing belligerent privilege under a specific norm or general principle of the
law of war," says Florentino Feliciano, Associate Justice of the Supreme court of the Philippines,
approaching the problem with a lawyer's keen analytical insight. 199 Once again, this assertion can
only be definitively tested if the case ever comes to trial, a problem that will be addressed in
Section V of this paper.
196"In both of these agreements, especially climate change. the United States was perceived as holding up
prospects for success. U.S. resistance to setting targets and timetables for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
had virtually isolated it from among the developed countries. Moreover. its reluctance to commit to difficult policies
and actions on greenhouse gases, which might include limitations on fossil fuel burning, transportation, and other
key sectors, undermined acceptance of U.S. positions that sought change by developing countries in areas such as
forest management or development practices." C.R.S ., International Environment: Briefing Book on Major Selected
~,supra note 194, at 73. The U.S. initially withheld from signing the Treaty on Biodiversity, but signed on
June 4, 1993 (and announced that its interpretive statement will be forthcoming, probably when implementing
legislation is sent to Congress). Ibid., 23.
197President Bush signed the instrument of ratification on October 13, 1992, with the advice and consent of
the Senate. The instrument of ratification was deposited with the U.N. Secretary General on October 15th. The
Convention will go into force within 90 days after 50 parties have deposited their ratifications, a process that is
expected to take two years. Ibid., 12.
198Knechtand Cicin-Sain concluded that "the 172 nations gathered in Rio generally agreed that the greatest
threats to a quality environment on a global basis are poverty, unrestrained population growth, and unsustainable
patterns of consumption." Knecht and Cicin-Sain, "Earth Summit Held," supra note 195, at 75.
199Feliciano, "Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War Measures," supra note 124, at
498 .
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V. Act of War or EcoTerrorism?
A. Petroleum: Resource or Weapon?
The vital importance of petroleum to modern warfare has raised the question whether oil is a
natural resource, and its use thus governed by the laws of usufruct under Article 55 of the 1907
Hague Regulations, or a potential weapon. If it is a natural resource, such as real estates, forests,
and agricultural estates, than the occupying government is under obligation to act as an
administrator of the property.200 If crude oil is a weapon, its treatment would fall under Article 53
of the Hague Regulationswt and the customary laws of war, which allow the occupying nation to
use it as it sees fit, just as if it were war booty seized on the battlefield.202
Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice provides that the court shall apply
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.''203 No specific duration
is required to establish a custom, and complete uniformity of practice is not required. For
example, some practices are regional rather than universal in nature, such as the consideration
200Kuwait's economy, like that of many other Middle Eastern countries, is based primarily on oil exports. Its
total annual exports amounted to $7.4 billion, with crude oil accounting for 81 percent of that amount. It holds
approximately 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Abdul-Reva Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy (1990)
143-146, cited in Katherine M. Kelly, "Declaring war on the Environment," supra note 146, at 931.
201Article 53 provides in part that "an army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and
realizable securities which are strictly the property of the States, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and
supplies and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations."
1907 Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 105, at 2308.
202Evan J. Wallach, "The Use of Crude Oil by an Occupying Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre,'
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41 (April 1992): 295.
203I.CJ. Statute, supra note 103.
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given to requests for political asylum.204 In some respects, then, states are allowed to write their
own rules. As one analyst noted, "It is well settled that by adherence to a particular practice or
principle of international law a state may ratify its acceptance of that custom as law."205
Looking for historical evidence of Iraqi practice in regard to the status of crude oil, we find that
Iraq has used oil in a tactical manner a number of times before the 1991 Persian Gulf war.206
During the Iran/Iraq war, Iraq sealed the wells in the Majnoun oil field and flooded the low-lying
areas in order to prevent Iran from exploiting those resources. In March of 1983 Iraq attacked
seven off-shore production platforms in the Nowruz oilfield, causing a major spill.207 Then in
February of 1984 Iraq declared an exclusion zone around the Iranian oil depot at Kharg Island and
proceeded, in disregard for customary law principles that say damage inflicted should be
proportional to the anticipated military advantage of an action, to randomly attack neutral oil tankers
that violated the zone.208 As one commentator noted in a legal appraisal of the conflict,
204"Today, extensive practice of the grant of diplomatic asylum appears to be restricted to the Latin american
republics where the practice has been employed so consistently that it can be said to represent by now a principle of
regional international law."von Glahn, Law Among Nations, supra note 10, at 309.
205Wallacb, "Munition de Guerre" supra note 202, at 296.
206Itis important to note that Saddam Hussein defined the war with Iraq as a "sovereign's war," whicb under
Islamic law is "limited in its objectives and its expenditure of the sovereigns' military capacity. It need not be
limited by considerations of discrimination and the like, save as those serve the political interests of the sovereign.
A 'war of survival' knows even fewer limits. It is a war to save the nation, and in that case, anything is justified--
unless it draws such vigorous reprisals that the 'nation' (Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th) are threatened:' John
Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants," in Cross. Crescent. and Sword: The
Justificatjon and Limitation of War jn Wester and Islamic Tradition, ed. James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay
(Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1990),216. The same lack of restraint was evident in the 1991
Gulf war, during which Iraq launched Scud missile attacks on Israel and on Bahrain.
207Experts had as much trouble estimating the size of the spill in 1983 as they did in 1991. Estimates of the
size of the slick vary wildly , ranging anywhere from 150 to 12,000 square miles . See Facts on File Yearbook 1983
(New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1984),224. A contemporary newspaper report dating from a month after the Iraqis
bombed the wells puts the figure at 250,000 barrels of oil. "Gulf Aides Defer Oil-Slick Parley," The New York
~, 7 April 1983, A7.
208"The so-called •tanker war' launched by Iraq from 1983 in order to cut off Iranian oil exports was no longer
proportional in relation to the objectives of self-defense, at least at the moment when it became obvious that me oil
exports of Iran could neither effectively be interrupted no any longer seriously be impeded." Rainer Lagoni,
"Comments: Methods or Means of Warfare, Belligerent Reprisals, and the Principle of Proportionality," in~
Gulf War of 1980-1988, ed. Ige F. Dekker and Harry H.G. Post (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 121.
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It is indeed fairly obvious that oil facilities are too much of a natural military objective in
many situations, and had proved so in the past, to make the idea of their special protection
widely acceptable. It is just one of the ironies of history that the Gulf War, with one of the
belligerent parties having been among the most directly interested protagonists of such
protection, should have been the first major war since the adoption of Protocol I to see the
proposed principle summarily brushed aside.209 Be this as it may, the episode can lead to no
other conclusion than that as between the belligerent parties, oil facilities were not specially
protected from attack.210
B. Possible Motives for the 1991 Spill
Given Iraq's previous use of crude oil for tactical purposes, when the first reports of the Gulf
War oil spill began to filter into the media, observers naturally sought a military rationale for Iraq's
actions. A number of interesting theories were advanced. One paper , trying to cover every
possibility, reported that "Western and Arab officials said they believed Iraq had sabotaged the oil
installations in hopes of disrupting aerial surveillance of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, or in preparation
for a possible Iraqi withdrawal from areas of Kuwait near the oil fields, or simply as a signal of
Iraq's willingness to lay waste to Kuwait if American-led forces advance on Iraqi troops."2ll
There was even some speculation that "the Iraqis might ignite the oil and turn the Persian Gulf into
209Iranian authorities in Abadan "at one stage explicitly took the view that an oil refinery complex near the
city. which had been under Iraqi attack, 'was not a civilian area and could be considered an economic installation of
military significance and. therefore. a legitimate target. ..• U.N. Doc. S/15834, annex paragraph 42, as cited by Frits
Kalshoven, "Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Methods and Means of Warfare." in The Gulf War of ]980-
.1.288.. supra note 208. at 107.
2101bid. Interestingly enough, Iraq was among 14 Arab states who sought to make oil facilities the object of
special protection during the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts. However. it was agreed by the Working Group that oil rigs and
petroleum storage facilities and oil refineries were not objects containing dangerous forces within the meaning of
Article 56 of Protocol I (which prohibits certain installations from being attacked even if they are valid military
targets because such attacks 'might cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population.') and the Arab representatives withdrew their proposals . Ibid.
2ttPhilip Shenon, "Iraq Sets Kuwaiti Refineries Afire as Allies Step up Bombing." The New York Times, 23
January 1991. AI.
61
a blazing sea that would consume allied warships,"212 a theory which the experts quickly
dismissed as having no basis in fact.213
As the vast extent of the spill became more apparent, Coalition officials suggested that
"Saddam could be trying to provoke a premature ground attack or thwart an amphibious landing by
u.s. Marines."214 This idea was more realistic than the "sea of fire" theory, because the oil slick
could indeed have complicated near-shore mine-sweeping operations and might also have fouled
the seawater cooling systems of the gas turbine hovercraft (LCACs) and the small diesel-powered
amphibious landing craft (AAVs), increasing the risk of equipment failure and the corresponding
danger to embarked personnel. However, the anticipated beach landing never materialized, so the
theory was never put to the test.
Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman, said that the Iraqis had apparently tried to use the oil
as a strategic weapon, but concluded that since the oil spill was not interfering with military
operations, dumping the oil into the Gulf was merely "an act of environmental terrorism."215
Terrorism is a psychological weapon gauged to strike at the enemy's resolution, and is particularly
effective when wielded against democratic countries, where opinion polls are headline news.
"Saddam Hussein may be counting on creating public jitters about Gulf water supplies, thus
212McFadden, "Oil Threatens Fishing and Water Supply," supra note 3, at 1.
213"Floating oil slicks are difficult to burn .. . (T)his is especially true if ignition is attempted some time
after a spill has occurred. With me passage of even a short time, me more volatile, lower flash-point fractions tend
to be lost by evaporation to me atmosphere. Also, as me oil spreads it becomes thinner, and may begin to break up
and emulsify. with tile volatiles gone, ignition becomes difficult or impossible; and with thin oil slicks, me heat
loss to the water beneath is sufficient to prevent sustained combustion. Reports of some investigators indicate mat
floating oils on water with thicknesses less man 3 millimeters will not bum." Arnold Frieberger and John M.
Byers, "Burning Agents for Oil Spill Cleanup," in proceedings of Joint Conference on Preyention and Control of
OU Spills: June 15-17. 1971, by tile American Petroleum Institute ([Washington, D.C.]: American Petroleum
Institute, 1971),245. The majority of me volatile components which make up 20-50 percent of most crude oils
will evaporate within the first 24-28 hours. Jordan and Payne, fate and Weatllerjng of Petroleum Spills in tlle
Marine Enyironment, supra note 17, at 12. Had Iraq really intended to ignite the spilled oil as a defensive measure,
it would have to have put mat plan into action within me first few days after the spill began.
214Brian Gellman, "Theories Vary on Motive for Spill," The Washington Post, 26 March 1991 , AI.
215Morrison, "War on the Environment," Natjonal Journal, 2 March 1991, supra note 100, at 536.
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adding to the political problems Allied leaders face in maintaining public support for the war,"
theorized an article in the Wall Street ]ouma1.216
"In the Arab world, Saddam Hussein may be scoring points simply by complicating American
military plans and prolonging the war," continued the writer. "To many Arabs, the standards by
which Saddam Hussein will be judged will be the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in which combined Arab
armies lasted only six days against the far smaller Israeli armed forces . By contrast, Iraq has
already lasted twice as long against a big and sophisticated collection of Western and Arab
annies."217 This highlights the cultural differences of the nations involved in the conflict, and
Saddam's shrewd ability to simultaneously strike a psychological blow against the Coalition while
increasing his prestige among his Arab neighbors.
"It's not a bad calculation in terms of appealing to Arab masses," said Richard Murphy, former
assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs. "It's all part of the image. He's going to
keep standing up and sticking his finger in our eye . . . Each day is further strengthening the image
that Arab resistance can overcome anything."218
C. Military Necessity and Rules of Usufruct
If the Iraqis were legitimately (in the context of historical precedent as evidence of custom)
using crude oil during the 1991 Gulf war as a munition de guerre, whether for tactical or
psychological purposes, they would be bound by three important customary law principles
revealed in the treaties this paper has already mentioned.
The principle of military necessity allows the destruction of property, but only in the pursuit of
216Barbara Rosewicz, "Upping the Ante: Gulf Oil Spill Shows Iraq's Resolve to Wage War on Its Own
Tenns," Wall Street Journal, 28 January 1991, A4.
217/bid.
2ts/bid.
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legitimate military goals. 219 The unquestioned superiority of the Coalition naval and air forces
arrayed against the Iraqis might give some credence to a plea of military necessity; having no air
force, the Iraqis could argue that they attempted to set up a smoke screen to hamper Coalition
bombing;220 having no navy, the Iraqis might say that they hoped that the oil might foul sea-water
cooling systems of the Coalition vessels and thus defend the Kuwaiti shoreline against a potential
amphibious landing. So the possibility exists that Iraq may have sufficient evidence to plead that
they attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to use the oil as a tactical or psychological weapon. The
court would then need to determine whether the ensuing damage to the environment and to the
civilian population of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was out of proportion to the anticipated military
benefit, and thus a violation of the customary laws of war. The court may well come to the same
conclusion that the military analysts of the United State reached: "Review of Iraqi actions makes it
clear the oil well destruction had no military purpose, but was simply punitive destruction at its
worst."221
It is important to note that the oil which the Iraqis pumped into the ocean was not a refined
petroleum product that might have had some military use to the Coalition forces, but that it in face
219The Soviet forces employed a scorched earth policy as they withdrew from the advancing German armies in
1941, burning anything they thought the German forces might find useful. The Germans in turn destroyed food
supplies, sheller, fuel, means of transport and communications as they retreated before the Allied and Soviet forces in
1944. The Nuremberg tribunal acquitted all of the accused German generals, saying that "Defendants in this case
were in many instances in retreat under arduous conditions wherein their commands were in serious danger of being
cut off. Under such circumstances, a commander mustnecessarily make quick decision to meet the particular
situation of his command. A great deal of latitude must be accorded lo him ... what constitutes devastation beyond
military necessity in these situations requires detailed proof of an operational and tactical nature." United States v.
Von Leeb, 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Milita[y Tribunals under Control Council Law No . 10
541 (1948) as quoted in Feliciano, "Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources," supra note 124, al515.
22OThough the official U.S. position was that the oil fires and the spill had no effect on allied operations,
word-of-mouth reports and injudicious statements by military spokesmen on the scene indicated that the smoke at
least was making mi ssion accomplishment more difficult than anticipated, Arkin, et al. , On Impact, supra note 34,
at 141.
221Conducl of !be Persian GulfWar.supra note 140, at 0-27. Reprisals against enemy prop erty are prohibited
by Articles 23 (g) and 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulatlons, and by Articles 33 and 53 of Geneva Convention IV of
1949.
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came from underground oil reserves in situ that had no immediate military value.222 As such, the
oil was part of the immovable property owned by the State of Kuwait, and thus govemed by the
rules of usufruct.223 Under these rules, the belligerent occupant does not acquire title to the
property or sovereignty over the territory.224 Control is limited to the duration of the occupation.
Movable property may be seized by the occupant.225 Immovable property may be used by the
occupant, provided it is neither sold nor destroyed.226
But how may these resources be used? The Intemational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
attempting to define the maximum permissible exploitation of occupied territories, held that "under
the rules of war, the economy of the occupied country can only be required to bear the expenses of
the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be
expected to bear."227 More recently, in regard to the dispute over oil resources off the coast of the
222For additional in-depth discussion on the legal status of in situ oil reserves as compared to refined products,
seegenerally Wallach, "The Use of Crude Oil by an Occupying Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre," supra
note 202.
223During the German occupation of France during World War I, Falck bad cut trees in a public forest under
contracts to the occupation army, but contrary to French forestry regulations. The court held that Article 55 of the
Hague Regulations required a belligerent occupant to observe regulations limiting the rate at which forests could be
exploited that existed prior to the occupation. Administration of Waters andForests v. Falck, 4 Ann. Dig 563,
(Court of Cassation, France 1927), cited as the leading case regarding the belligerent occupant's right to exploit
publicly owned natural resources by Brice M. Clagett and O. Thomas Johnson, Jr, "May Israel as a Belligerent
Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?" American Journal of
International Law 72 (1978), 564. The article examines Israel's claims of rights to explore and exploit petroleum
resources off the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel occupied following the six-day war in 1967.
224Inherentin both the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention is the principle that sovereignty does
not vest in the occupant but rather remains in a state of abeyance pending reversion to the ousted government.
Article 43 and Article 47 of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention respectively seek to protect the
ousted government's interests by requiring the belligerent occupant to preserve the pre-war laws and institutions of
the occupied territory unless prevented from doing so by military necessity or concern for public welfare.
225"An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly
the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable
property belonging to the State whicb may be used for military operation." Article 55, Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
226Hague Regulations, supra note 105, Article 55.
2271 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 6 E.RJ.2. 69, 120 (1947), in
Clagett and Johnson, supra note 223, at 581.
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Sinai Peninsula, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of State said that: "Our legal view is that
Israel , as an occupying power in that particular area, does not have the right to exploit natural
resources in occupied territory that were not already being exploited when the occupation
began."228 However, legal scholars are generally in agreement that "natural resources such as oil
and coal (may be) extracted providing prudence is shown in preserving the corpus of the property
and providing their use will not result in depletion ."229
It is beyond dispute that no matter which of these standards may be applied to the Gulf war
situation, Iraq clearly exceeded the limits of fair use of the resources of an occupied territory. Very
little of the oil dumped into the Persian Gulf was recovered, and the Kuwaiti oil fields seriously
damaged. Under normal conditions, oil and water separate over millions of years. Rapid
production of oil (such as that which resulted from the destruction of well-heads and unrestrained
pumping of oil into the Gulf) will cause salty water to contaminate the oil deposit, which may ruin
the wel1.23o A new well may be drilled near the existing well, or additional processing facilities
could be constructed to separate the water from the oil, but both courses of action would
significantly increase the cost of production.231The geological trapping structure can be damaged
by the water seeping through the porous rock to replace the oil that was extracted too quickly. If
the water reaches the bore-head of the well, the well will "water-out."232 Because of the superb
228The New York Times, February 18, 1977, at 1, as quoted by Allen Gerson, "Offshore Oil Exploration by a
Belligerent Occupant The Gulf of Suez Dispute," American Journal of International Law 71 (1977): 725.
229AIIan Gerson, "War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the Contemporary International
Legal System," Harvard Intemational Law Journal 18 (1977): 54!.
230()ther damage to a petroleum reservoir that can result from blowouts includes pressure loss, gas migration,
and relative permeability reduction, all of which further reduce ultimate petroleum recovery. C.R.S., Environmental
Aftennath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 32.
231See "Crisis in the Gulf," The Independent, January 26, 1991, at 3, quoted in Feliciano, "Marine Pollution
and Spoliation of Natural Resources," supra note 124, at 492-493 .
232See Maria Kelmas, "Kuwait Pumps Too Much Oil Too Soon," The IndeDendem, May 22, 1992, at 12. A
number of wells evidently did this, for pictures taken by the National Science Foundation showed steam escaping
from some of the wells. In other cases, the wells burned themselves out as the flow of water in the oil increased.
C.R.S., Enyironmental Aftennath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 32.
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international effort to rapidly put out the fires and cap the wells, Kuwait may have actually lost less
than 2 percent of its estimated 97 billion barrel reserve, but the reservoir damage caused by the
rapid and uncontrolled pumping from so many wells simultaneously may cause additional losses in
the future. 233 Should the Kuwaiti government decide to pursue the issue, it could make a good
case against Iraq for violation of the rules of usufruct set forth in the Hague Regulations, which are
part of customary international law, and the Geneva Convention, to which Iraq is a party.
233"As formation waterencroached into the fields along theedgesand from below, naturalgas escapedand
some of the heavier oil was left behind. The pressures in the oil fields then became uneven, with higher water levels
in some parts an d lower gas pressures in others. This could adversely affect ultimate oil recoveryand a significant
portionof provedreservesmay become unrecoverable." Ibid.
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VI. Application of the Law to the Crime
Even before the end of the air war, angry lawmakers in the United States were calling for a
punishment to fit the crime.234 They were motivated by more than a mere desire for revenge,
however. As one legal scholar shrewdly observed,
governmental policy decisions in a time of international crisis consist of both legal and
political dimensions in a constant state of dynamic interaction with each other. Since they are
essentially inseparable, inevitably each decisional dimension--Iegal and political-vis evaluated in
light of the outcome they jointly produce ... a pattern of successful political action creates new
legal rules through legitimization of that state behavior by lack of effective political opposition to it.
An accumulation of political failures also creates law by generating political pressures to establish
legal rules prohibiting the unsuccessful political conduct in the future. This success phenomenon
is responsible for the development of customary internationallaw.235
The previous sections have shown that the Iraqi actions were clearly in violation of both
customary and conventional law. Letting Saddam Hussein "get away with" the environmental
devastation deliberately visited on the Gulf by his military troops would be setting a dangerous
international precedent. But how was he to be punished? Of all the options debated, the one that
seemed the most attractive to the elected representatives of the United States was "haling Saddam
and his henchmen before a Nuremberg-like tribunal to hold them accountable for blatant violations
234See H.R. Con . Res 57, l02nd Cong., 2nd sess. (1991) denouncing the oil spill caused by Iraq and
demanding that Saddam Hussein be held "legally, morally, and financially" liable for the devastation, presented to the
House of Representatives on January 29, 1991. Senator Joseph 1. Lieberman was more emphatic in his comments.
"I would put him to death. I would impose capital punishment without hesitation." He continued to note that there
was "substantial sentiment," in Congress to create "some kind of treaty or convention that would make clear that
vindictive assaults on the environment like this would be punished - and punished severely ." Quoted in David Freed,
"Hussein Trial Urged Over Oil Damage," Los Angeles Times, 18 March 1991, Al and A6.
235Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law (Durham: Duke University Press , 1985),
133-134.
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of internationallaw."236 This idea was perceived to have several advantages; it would emphasize
that the dispute was with Saddam Hussein, and not the Iraqi people, and it would serve as a
warning that harming foreigners (including Americans) would not go unpunished. It was
suggested that it would also serve to warn Saddam that the violations of the rights of native
Kuwaitis--or for that matter Iraqi citizens--would not go unchecked by the international
community, though even a cursory review of history will reveal that the concept of national
sovereignty allows the despotic ruler a great deal of latitude in dealing with his subjects. With an
almost humorous disregard for Islamic legal tradition and procedure, it was suggested that making
Saddam susceptible to apprehension might shorten or preclude a conflict because "the specter of
trial allows an implicit plea bargain: security against a foreordained verdict for the freeing of
Kuwait."237
Others were more cautious. In testimony before the several subcommittees of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Shibley Telhami, Professor of Government at Cornell, said,
"By late spring, Saddam Hussein, never popular before as most Arabs recognized
him to be ruthless and ambitious, had become a popular man. In his designs for Kuwait
and for Arab leadership, Hussein exploited the popular sentiment of despair and frustration
with Arab governments by dangling a military options out of the status quo. As a
consequence, the defeat of Iraq and Saddam Hussein will also defeat the hopes, dreams,
and pride of many Arabs, build around Iraq's perceived military and industrial potential,
and the U.S. will be blamed."238
But before any action could be taken, a number of difficult questions needed to be
answered.
236Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittees on Anus Control, International
Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East, Update on the Situation in the Persian Gulf, WIst Cong.,
2nd sess., 26 September and 6 December 1990, 23.
2371bid., 24
238Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Anus Control, International Security
and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East, Hearings on Post-War Policy Issues in the Persian Gulf, lO2nd
Cong., 1st sess ., 31 January, 21 and 28 February, and 11 April 1991,91.
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A. Where is the defendant?
One of the major stumbling blocks mentioned in any discussion was the lack of a
defendant. Unlike many of the crimes against humanity committed by individual members of the
occupying Iraqi army, the deliberate pollution of the Gulf had to be planned and coordinated by
senior personnel in Saddam Hussein 's administration, and executed according to a calculated time-
table. However, neither Saddam Hussein, nor the members of his Revolutionary Command
council, nor the high-ranking military officers who implemented their plans for the destruction of
the Kuwaiti wells and pollution of the Persian Gulf are in custody. Since the Coalition forces had
rapidly backed out of Iraq following the accomplishment of the limited military objectives of their
mission, the potential defendants are not subject to apprehension or extradition.
Most common-law systems do not allow trial in absentia, but in all other inquisitorial
models it can be done.239 Furthermore, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the basis
of the Nuremberg trials, provided that the Tribunal could take action against a person charged with
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, even in his absence. 24o Two cases
came up during the Nuremberg trials in which the accused was absent; in one case, the defendant
was non compos mentis and in no condition to be tried, and in the other, the accused was missing
but presumed to be alive.241 So there is precedent for such an action against Saddam Hussein.
It was suggested that a trial, even a trial in absentia, "would permit an ordered survey of the
misdeeds of Saddam Hussein ... and would disclose to the entire world, and particularly to that
part of the Arab world which still considers him to be an Islamic saint who fought the infidel, that
239Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and
Refugees, War Crimes. 102nd Cong., Ist sess. , 13 March 1991,34.
240Louise Rene Beres, "Toward Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes under International Law: Jurisprudential
Foundations and Jurisdictional Choices," California Western International Law Journal 22 (1991/1992): 17.
241Congress, War Crimes, supra note 239, at47. It later turned out that the individual was, in fact, dead at
the time that his trial was held.
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he is nothing but a ruthless and power hungry dictator."242 In the end, however, the decision was
made that the public relations value was not worth the time and expense of staging such a trial.
The old principle which held that a state has a duty under international law either to
extradite or to prosecute criminals within its territory if another state requests extradition has by and
large been replaced by the view that there is no general duty to extradite an alleged criminal in
absence of an explicit bilateral agreement or convention imposing such a duty. Though the United
States has occasionally granted extradition on the basis of comity or reciprocity, it has chosen for
the most part to rely on bilateral extradition treaties.243 However, the "mere existence of treaties
mandating extradition does not impose an affirmative obligation on the United States to exhaust
extradition procedures before attempting more irregular methods of rendition, such as
abduction."244
There is precedent for apprehending terrorists who cannot be haled into COUlt by formal
extradition procedures, either because they elude custody by their own government or because their
govemment refuses to honor the extradition request. In 1987 the F.B.! lured a Lebanese national
into international waters, then kidnapped him and forcibly transported him to the United States to
stand trial for his suspected involvement in the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner. By
apprehending him in international waters, the United States managed to avoid charges of infringing
on any other nation 's territorial sovereignty. Any attempt to snatch Saddam Hussein out of Iraq
would be subject to such a charge. The situation is immensely complicated by the fact that Saddam
Hussein is the President of Iraq. As one commentator soberly noted, "Under international law
there is normally a very substantial difference between abduction of a terrorist or any other hastes
humani generis and abduction of any head of state. Indeed, there is almost always a presumption
242Congress, War Crimes, supra note 239, at 51.
243Gregory G. Schuetz, "Apprehending Terrorists Overseas UnderUnitedStatesand International Law: A
Case Study of the Fawaz Younis Arrest,"Harvard International Law Journal29 (Spring 1988): 521.
244/bid.
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of sovereign immunity, a binding rule that exempts each state and its high officials from the judicial
jurisdiction of another state."245 Because of the political ramifications (not to mention the
impracticality) of this option, it was not even mentioned during the hearings on war crimes before
the International Law Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
B. Who would hold the trial?
As late as September of 1991 there was talk of a return of Coalition military forces to Iraq
to enforce the terms of the cease-fire. If such a return were authorized, the Coalition forces might
be able to identify and apprehend various alleged Iraqi war criminals. This possibility sparked
another lively debate, this one about where and how the trial should be held. Of all the options
debated, three in particular merit a brief discussion: trial by an international military tribunal,
modeled after the one in Nuremberg; trial by an international criminal court; and trial by Arab
members of the Gulf Cooperative Council.
1. Trial by an International Military Tribunal
This tribunal could be impaneled either by the victorious Coalition allies, or by the United
Nations. Both options were debated before the International Law Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee.
Professor Levie, Professor of Law at St. Louis University, immediately dismissed the
possibility of obtaining Security Council support for the creation of a military tribunal. He said
that he did not believe that "the Soviet Union would want to see their former protege on trial before
an international court or before any COUlt." He believed that the People's Republic of China would
also veto such an action, and advocated drafting a resolution to create an international court "on the
245Beres. "Jurisprudential Foundations and Jurisdictional Choices," supra note 240. at 17.
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model of Nuremberg" to be put before the General Assembly for a vote.246
John Moore, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, took the opposing view.
According to his interpretation of the United Nations charter, the General Assembly could only
establish an ad hoc war crimes tribunal through the Security Councilor through multilateral
treaties. He acknowledged Professor Levie's reservations, but pointed out that no one could have
predicted the degree of Security Council support for use of force in the Gulf, and that "we ought to
try the Security Council."247
Both agreed that action by the Gulf Cooperative Council was an attractive option because
such a court would be composed entirely of Arabs, and thus avoid some of the difficult issues that
would arise if the West were to impanel a court to try the Middle East. As General Taylor summed
it up, "The fact that we have been so successful in the gulf by no means indicated that all of the
people around there like us. I don't believe they do."248
General Taylor, who served as chief prosecutor for 12 of the Nuremberg trials, was also
very careful to point out the differences between that situation and the one that existed at the end of
the Gulf war. "In Nuremberg there was no Hitler. We had all the surviving people that ought be
tried in our hands . . . we had also been able to put together tons of documents which, from the
evidentiary standpoint, were 99 percent of the case--that certainly isn't at the moment the same
situation today."249 He said that while there was little doubt that the human rights violations and
the looting of Kuwait, probably ordered or at least condoned by Saddam Hussein and the military
leadership, were in violation of the laws of war, the task of amassing the necessary evidence to
convict individual soldiers of individual acts would pose a substantial administrative challenge.
246Congress, war Crimes, supranote 239, al42.
247bid., 6l.
248/bid., 18.
249/bid., 8.
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2. Trialby an International Criminal Court
Aside from the fact that no international criminal court exists, and overlooking the
discouraging track record of the International COUlt of Justice, this option received quite a bit of
scholarly attention during the end of the Gulf war. Many legal experts and politicians expressed
the hope that the blatant human rights violations committed by the Iraqis, along with the looting of
Kuwait and the wanton ecological devastation, would prove to be a focusing event of sufficient
impact to overcome the political barriers to the creation of an international criminal court
empowered to deal with international crimes. In this category falls such acts as war Climes, crimes
against humanity, terrorism, slavery, genocide, and aggression. Elaborate plans were proposed
for the creation of such a court, but the moment in history passed by. As Cherif Bassiouni, the
President of the International Human Rights Law Institute, observed, 'This is not the first time this
question has been before the international community. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 sought the
establishment of such a court and nothing came about It seems that after each major conflict, we
have great emotions and great excitement about prosecuting, usually the vanquished, and wanting
to create an international system. Then, as soon as the conflict is over, we forget about it."250
The Persian Gulf war was followed in rapid succession by the floods in Bangladesh, the
famine and civil war in Somalia, and the civil war in Bosnia. And, as Bassiouni feared, the
impetus was lost and the international criminal court faded from the public view into the realm of
academic journals, where it continues to be debated with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
250/bid., 22.
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VII. Conclusions
A. The Question ofReparations
During the early days of the crisis, the Arab nations adopted a resolution in which they
called for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to pay reparations. When asked by Congressman
Solarz whether the United States subscribed to that objective, Secretary of State James Baker
carefully replied, "It is not one of the objective or goals of any of the five U.N. resolutions, so that
is not an objective of ours now. That is a matter, of course, that I think would come into play if
and when any negotiation between Iraq and the legitimate government of Kuwait might begin
following their restoration to power."251 When pressed on the subject, he reiterated that "while we
would be sympathetic to that solution, just as I might add we would be sympathetic to seeing any
illegal actions against the United States citizens addressed under intemationallaw," it was not one
of the four objectives outlined by the administration, nor was it within the scope of any of the five
U.N. Security Council resolutions.252
Thus, from the beginning, there was a clear difference of-opinion between the elected
representatives, who were trying to express the indignation of their constituents, and the State
Department appointees, who were trying to patch together a coalition of forces to tackle the
perceived threat to national security.253 With this in mind, it should not be surprising that the
international political issues prevailed.
251Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Hearings and Markup. WIst
Cong., 2nd sess ., 4 and 27 September and 18 October, 1990, 17.
252Ibid., 18.
253When appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press" on March 17, 1991, U.S . Attorney General Dick Thornburg
refused to comment when asked if the Justice Department was assembling a file to possibly prosecute Hussein for
alleged war crimes. Freed, "Hussein Trial Urged Over Oil Damage," supra note 234, at 6.
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Iraq was not party to either of the two conventions that deals specifically with
environmental damage in war, but the need to appeal to the ENMOD Convention or Protocol I of
the Geneva Convention was obviated by the passage of Security Council Resolution 674, which
made Iraq liable for any loss, damage or injury to Kuwait and to third-party states such as Saudi
Arabia.
B. Security Council Resolution 687
When the Security Council passed Resolution 687 on the third of April in 1991, the United
States gave its support to the action . According to the Resolution, Iraq was obligated to pay
reparations for direct losses arising out of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait,254 accept the
internationally recognized border with Kuwait, renounce terrorism as a means of accomplishing
political objectives, and give up its weapons of mass destruction.255 Only then would a cease-fire
be forthcoming. There were some who saw the inclusion of environmental damage as a
components of compensable loss to be a significant blow on behalf of the environment. But
nowhere in the text of the Resolution does it indicate the jurisdictional foundation for imposing
financial liability for environmental damages. The CR.S. report concluded that "recognition of
environmental damage by the Security Council primarily stems from its concern that Iraq be wholly
accountable for damage flowing from its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait and not from
254Markham BaIl, "The Iraq Claims Process--A Progress Report ," Journal of International Arbitration 9
(March 1992): 45. BaIl writes, "Current estimates of the claims for 'direct loss' arising out of the invasion and
occupation of Kuwait run in the range of 100 billion dollars or more. The Secretary-General has estimated that if 30
percent of Iraq's oil export revenues are paid into the Fund, the contribution to the Fund will amount to only 6 or 7
billion dollars per year. This figure could be no more than the interest that would accumulate on claims of 100
billion. In addition, it is estimated that there are 80 billion in claims against Iraq that arose before 2 August 1990
and which remain to be satisfied outside the U.N. process."
255Congressional Research Service, UN. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq: Compliance and
Implementation (Washington: Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, March
1992),27-36 [hereinafter C.R.S., Report on Compliance). See also John J. Goldman, "With 5-Paragraph Letter,
U.N. Formally Ends War," Los Angeles Times, 12 April 1991, All.
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any judgment by the Security council on the rules that applied once hostilities broke out."256 In
other words, the Security Council was concerned with meting out punishment, not making law.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of environmental damages in the list of actionable claims set an
important precedent. for it was the first time that the UnitedNations recognized damage to the
natural environment as a separate category of war claims. distinct from economic losses. Whether
this includes non-use value remains to be tested. for no one has yet called upon this precedent to
uphold a monetaryclaim against the government or citizens of another nation.
1. Arms-Control Provisions ofResolution 687
Resolution 687 sought to address Iraq's negligence in conforming with certain international
arms-control agreements,257 and called on the recalcitrantnation to comply with the 1925Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use'in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Walfare,258 of which Iraq was a party. The Resolution also called on
Iraq to become a patty to the 1972Conventionon the Prohibition of the Development. Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.259
These measures reflect the wide-spread fear during the war that Iraq would resort to chemical or
biological warfare, and while the effort is laudable. it was incomplete. While the United Nations
256C.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 73.
257See Security Council Resolution 687, supra note 13, at Paragraph 7, which "invites Iraq to reaffirm
unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare . . . "
258"Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases , and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," 26 U.S.T . 571; T.I.A.S. 8061. Done June 17, 1925; entered into force
February 8, 1928 (April 10, 1975 for the United States). Iraq is a party with reservations. U.S. Deparunent of
State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaties in Force, ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of State , Office of the
Legal Adviser, 1993), 334 [hereinafter U.S. Treaties in Forcel .
259"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction," done April 10, 1972 and entered into force March 26,
1975. 26 U.S.T. 583; T.I.A.S. 8062; 1015 U.N.T .S. 163. As of January 1, 1993, Iraq had not complied. U.S.
Treaties in Force, supra note 258, at 302.
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had leverage, it should have demanded that Iraq also ratify Protocol 1. Having used crude oil twice
to wreck havoc and cause wanton environmental damage during hostilities, it is certain that, short
of major ideological and political changes, Iraq is likely to do so again in the future. 260
2. The Compensation Commission
The Security Council created a Commission to administer a Compensation Fund to pay
claims for direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources,26l or injury to foreign governments, nationals, and corporations resulting from the Iraqi
invasion and occupation of Kuwait,262 In Resolutions 706 and 712, Iraq was authorized to sell oil
for a period of six months (which expired in March of 1992) sufficient to provide up to $1.6
billion for the purchase of items of humanitarian character, with 30 percent of this amount to be
earmarked for the Compensation Fund.263
The U.N. Compensation Commission went to work with enthusiasm, industry, and
unfounded optimism. In the first year of its existence, it met six times and adopted legal criteria for
the filing of claims, produced and distributed claims forms for all individual and corporate claims,
adopted procedures for processing claims, and received and filed the first "urgent" claims of
260For further discussion of additionalefforts the United Nationscould have taken to strengthen Iraq's treaty
obligations in regard to development and use of nonconventional weapons,see Katherine M. KelIy, "Declaring War
on the Environment," supra note 146, al943-950.
26lThe Kuwaiti government has estimated that it lost approximately three percent of its 100 billion barrel oil
reserves during the Gulf War, but Westernoil industry specialistshave been estimating remaining reserves as low as
58 biIlion barrels. Feliciano, "Marine PolIutionand Spoliation of Natural Resources," supra note 124, al493.
Approximately 1.5billion barrels of oil were burned during the Gulf War, and approximately 14.5 billion barrels
were spoiled by water, These estimatesarc complicatedby the fact that, because Kuwait resumed production
immediately after getting the oil fires undercontrol, waterconlaminatedas much as 20 percent of the remaining
reserves. In either case, and by any standard, il is clear mat the financial loss to Kuwait was tremendous.
262C.R.S. Report on Compliance, supra note 255, all?
263/bid., 22-23.
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individuals who suffered deportation, death, serious injury or personal losses up to $100,000.264
The established procedures give priority to the prompt handling of a large number of small claims
by individuals. All claims are required to be presented by governments. Any recovery through the
U.N. process will be allocated to claimants by the national governments that presented the claims,
either on the merits of the individual case, or on a pro rata basis, as determined by the national
government.265
Western observers, sensitized by the Exxon Valdez spill, were perplexed by the failure of
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to aggressively pursue damage claims. The International Maritime
Organization pledged about $4 million in the form of a special Gulf Response Fund. For long-
term assessment under the UNEP International Oceanographic Commission, only $2.6 million of
the $3.5 million requested was actually allocated by UNEP.266 Germany donated over $3 million
dollars in equipment, and the Japanese pitched in another $1 million; a generous amount, until
compared to the $1.5 to $2 billion that the Kuwaitis spent to put out the oil well fires, or the $2
billion that was spent to clean up the Exxon Valdez spill.267 The Saudis spent about $2 million on
the clean-up effort, largely to protect the desalination plant at Jubai1.268 Though these cleanup
costs can be readily tallied and the bill presented, no effort was made to undertake a comprehensive
environmental assessment for the purpose of evaluating total damages. 269 Given the fact that there
are an estimated two million potential claims for deportation, serious personal injury (including
2e4Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East, Hearings
on U.N. Role in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi Compliance with U.N. Resolutions, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April and
29 July, 1992,98.
265Ball, "The Iraq Claims Process ," supra note 255, at 40.
266C.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 41.
267"Major Postwar Clean-up Effort Needed to Avoid Long-Term Gulf Damage, Group Says," International
Environmental Reporter 14 (March 13, 1991): 132. Quoted in Laura Edgerton, "Eco-Terrorist Acts During the
Persian Gulf War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?" Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law (1992): 154.
268C.R.S., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra note 2, at 41 .
269Congress, Oversight Hearing on Ecoterrorism Intlicted as Result of the Gulf War, supra note 15, at 5-6.
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death of family members) and property and business losses yet to be settled,27oit seems very
unlikely that claims for environmental damages will ever be given priority consideration by the
Claims Commission.271
C. Iraq's Response
A letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations protested the unfairness of Resolution 687, claiming that
Further evidence of the resolution's biased and iniquitous nature is that it holds Iraq
liable for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, although this
liability has not been established; on the other hand, it makes no mention of Iraq's own
right to obtain compensation for the established facts of damage to its environment and
depletion of its natural resources as a result of more than 88,000 tons of explosives, or for
the destruction of water distribution networks, generating stations and the road network,
which has spread disease and epidemics and caused serious harm to the environment.272
The letter goes on to complain that Iraq's internal and external security have been seriously
threatened by the continuing efforts to interfere, by force of arms, in its internal affairs, and claims
that the attempts to disarm Iraq and to prohibit it from acquiring war materiel for defense endanger
270Ball, "The Iraqi Claims Process," supra note 255, at 37. It is doubtful whether the governments of Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia will choose to pursue these claims, let along possible claims for environmental damages. The
reasoning behind this reluctance to make Iraq pay damages is explained by Cherif Bassiouni in his written statement
to the Committee on the Judiciary. "Heads of State and senior government officials have historically wanted to
shield themselves from any fonn of international accountability. Their successors and even their opponents so
frequently cover up for them for fear that they too may find themselves in a similar situation, or because they feel
that domestic political peace may warrant it. This was evident when Bangladesh did not carry out its intended
prosecution of Pakistani military personnel after the independence from that region, which was once part of
Pakistan." Congress, War Crimes, supra note 239, at 151. For additional discussion of this philosophy of tacitly
letting "bygones be bygones," see generally Frank and Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force," American Journal ofInternational Law 67 (1973): 275, and Paust and Blaustein,
"War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience," vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
11 (1978): 1.
271Fora detailed analysis of the claims process, see Nicolas C. Ulmer, "The Gulf War Claims Institution,"
Journal of International Arbitration 10 (March 1993): 85-93.
272C.R.S., Report on Compliance, supra note 255, at 55.
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the security and stability of the Middle East. There are the predictable efforts to shift the focus
from Iraq to Israel by claiming that the United States is preventing the Security Council from
assuming its proper responsibility for the Arab-Zionist conflict and that Israel, "an expansionist
aggressor country which is occupying the territory of neighboring countries, usurping the right of
the Palestinian Arab people against which it daily commits the most honible atrocities, and refusing
to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council ... will be the first to benefit."273
In summary, Iraq's position is that the provisions of Resolution 687, including the
mechanism established for reparations, constitutes a "severe assault on the Iraqi's people's right to
life and a flagrant denial of its inalienable rights to sovereignty and independence and its right to
exercise its free choice."274
Three rounds of face-to-face negotiations between Iraqi and U.N. Secretariat
representatives failed to placate Iraq's complaints about the unfairness of the U.N. mechanism set
up to finance reparations,275 and Iraq eventually requested a five-year moratorium on meeting its
financial obligations, including payments into the Compensation Fund.276 The United States
slowly backed away from the idea of holding trials for Saddam Hussein and his military officers.
'The principle reason for this diminished enthusiasm lies with geopolitical factors, especially the
fear that the U.S.-led prosecution would not play well in the Arab world."277 In the fall of 1992,
the bi-annual United Nations review again concluded that Iraq had not yet satisfactorily complied
with the conditions of the cease fire, and that economic sanctions would continue.278
273/bid., 56.
274/bid., 58.
275Hearings on the U.N. Role in the Persian Gulf and IraqiComvliance witb U.N. Resolutions, 36.
276United NationsSecurityCouncil, "FurtherReportof theSecretary-General on the Statusof Compliance by
Iraq with the Obligations Placed upon it underCertain of theSecurity Council Resolutions," S/23687 (7 March
1992) in Hearinl:s on U.N. Role in tbe Persian Gulfand IraqiCompliance with UN. Resolutions, p. 191.
277Beres, "Jurisprudential Foundations andJurisdictional Choices," supra note240, at 18.
278CNN Headline News, November 18, 1993.
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D. Summary
The Gulf War was an important step in the development of the customary law prohibitions
on environmental destruction, and particularly on such destruction as collateral damage of a
military campaign. It served as a focusing event that forged a consensus among a new generation
of voters, soldiers, and politicians, and graphically warned them that "environmental destruction is
a given result of modern war. Such destruction may have been previously thought of as incidental
to the conduct of war, but Iraq's intentional actions to release oil into the Gulf, and its later
destruction of the oil wells, elevates environmental damage to a more core tool of military action,
reprisal and revenge."279
Iraq is not party to Geneva Protocol I or the ENMOD Convention, the two international
conventions that strongly condemn environmental damage during war and explicitly prohibit the
use of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes. However, sufficient customary
law exists, in the form of the Hague Convention IV and the laws of war, to support a case against
Iraq for violation of the laws of usufruct in its wanton destruction of the oil, if it is viewed as the
immovable property of the state of Kuwait. Even were the oil spill to be viewed as a tactical
weapon, a case could be made that the damage done far exceeded any anticipated military benefit,
and that the dumping of the oil into the Gulf violated the restraining principle of military necessity.
Security Council Resolution 687 has the potential to become an important precedent, for it
listed environmental damages among the war claims for which Iraq owes reparations. Taken in
conjunction with the proliferation of peacetime treaties designed to protect the environment and the
emerging customary law evidenced by the Stockholm Declaration, the World Charter for Nation,
and the Earth Summit of 1992, it is clear that there is an emerging international consensus that
massive environmental destruction will no longer be tolerated as an unpleasant but unavoidable
side-effect of war.
279Arkin , et al.,On Impact. supra note 35, at 146.
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Unfortunately, only time can tell when that precedent will be followed . Preoccupied by
successive crises in Somalia, Haiti, Rawanda and the former Yugoslavia, the international
community lacks the political will to enforce the Security Council Resolutions with further military
action. Iraq continues to resist any pressure placed on it in the form of economic sanctions. Even
if some money for war reparations were forthcoming, the human rights claims would certainly take
precedence over environmental damages , however these damages might be measured. The Persian
Gulf war and the oil spill were yesterday's crisis. There is some continued scholarly interest in the
international law questions raised by this unprecedented act of vindictive destruction, as evidenced
by the consideration of the need for a Fifth Geneva Convention, but it appears that until the norms
represented by the World Charter for Nature and the documents drawn up at the Earth Summit
have been further defined by conventions and case law, environmental activists will have to make
do with the same patch-work quilt of existing conventions that has served (or in this case, failed to
serve) to protect the environment for the past three decades.
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